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CHAPTER 1. THE DEMONIZATION OF CHINA AND RUSSIA: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Background Context  
 
 China and Russia (C/R) are modernizing their navies, and the West is paying attention. 
Think tank reports, congressional hearings and media coverage have increasingly pointed to the 
two states’ naval buildups as alarming signals of power projections to the regional level and 
beyond. Many have referred to such naval buildups as “disruptive,” “aggressive” or 
“revisionist,” implying that one can and should read a state’s intentions based on its arms 
policies. But what if these assumptions of intentions, which lie at the root of U.S. paranoia vis-à-
vis C/R, are not true? Even if C/R are indeed pursuing offensive naval buildups, are offensive 
strategies necessarily signals of intentions? What are the causes of offensive strategies at the 
systemic, international level, and could there be other independent variables at play that may be 
mistaken for intentions? In this thesis, I argue that if structural factors reveal the international 
environment to be offense-dominant, even highly offensive arms races are not indicative of 
offensive intentions. 
 Naval buildups have disproportionally contributed to the narrative of offensive intentions 
for Russia and especially for China. A powerful navy has historically been a sign of great power 
ambition – think the U.S. and the Great Britain, the last two global hegemons that also happened 
to patrol and control oceans around the world. C/R’s navies previously experienced a long stage 
of stagnation, but ever since the early 2000s the two states have increasingly built on naval 
firepower vis-à-vis their potential adversaries. This is seen in both states’ strategic documents 
and increasing military investments. For example, in their defense planning documents, China 
		 8 
and Russia have called upon their armed forces to abandon “the traditional mentality that land 
outweighs sea,”1 to “safeguard the security of overseas interests,” 2 and to deter increased 
military exercises and mobilization of forces by other state actors in maritime territories of vital 
importance to the two states.3 Reflective of these languages in defense planning, C/R have 
heavily invested in capabilities that neutralize enemy forces on subsurface, surface and air levels 
of combat – capabilities that western analysts often term as “anti-access area-denial” (A2/AD) in 
the near sea areas. Geographically, the Chinese naval forces concentrate in the South and East 
China Seas, where China has ongoing territorial disputes, and the Russian naval forces 
concentrate in Black and Baltic Seas, where Russia comes face-to-face with member states of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Many assume that expansionist intentions drive such arms racing behaviors. After all, if 
not due to offensive intentions, why else would states engage in such expensive and destabilizing 
policies? The answer here, I argue, is more nuanced than simply intentions. It has been a 
common observation among scholars and analysts that fear, vulnerability and the need for 
security drive both China’s and Russia’s foreign policies.4 This is not to even mention the 
defensive narrative that both states seem to be putting forth.  
Assigning types and fixed intentions to the two states is deeply problematic and 
tautological. It states that revisionist states will build up because they are revisionist, and that 
                                                
1 “China’s Military Strategy,” The Information Office of the State Council, May 26, 2015, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm 
2 Ibid. 
3 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 20, 2017 № 327 on approval of the fundamentals 
of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period until 2030,” Official 
Website of Law Ministry, July 20, 2017,  
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201707200015?index=1&rangeSize=1 
4 Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial 
Expansion,” International Studies Review 12 (2010): 505-532. Thomas Graham discussed at length the driver 
behind Russia’s foreign policy is geographical security. See Thomas Graham, “Fear and Opportunity: Russia’s 
Foreign Policy,” interview by Michael Moran, Diffusion, Carnegie Corporation.  
		 9 
states are revisionist because they build up. The inference of state intentions through actions 
requires intentions be the only reason that states may want to build up militarily. This, I argue, is 
not true. Under offense dominance and relative power balance, all parties are likely to pursue 
offensive buildups, and revisionist intentions are not a necessary condition for offensive policies. 
Therefore, while intentions may in fact lead to buildup, buildup does not signal intentions. In 
order to determine whether C/R’s buildups are signals of offensive intentions, we must first build 
a more nuanced understanding on why the two states pursue arms race and offensive strategies in 
the first place. 
The stakes are high. Perceptions of malign intentions have been prevalent in both public 
discourse and policymaking circles. It is only in due course that such perceptions will drive U.S. 
responses to the behaviors, if this has not already happened. Misreading another state’s 
intentions may put U.S. security interests in harm’s way. On the one hand, arms buildup is 
economically expensive. Pursuant to the law of diminishing marginal utility, an offensive arms 
policy necessitates state-of-the-art technology that is increasingly expensive to build. On the 
other hand, arms buildup also has its security costs. Opposing states may react to one side’s 
buildup with buildup of its own. Consequently, by building up its own offensive capabilities, the 
U.S. may paradoxically lower existing advantages in U.S. military capabilities. In the worst 
possible scenario, an offensive arms policy can lead to uncalled-for tensions in bilateral relations. 
This may include potential miscommunications and minimized cooperation in non-security 
domains, thereby essentially fulfilling the tragic downward spiral otherwise known as the 
security dilemma. Assessing the causes of offensive arms race will, therefore, critically inform 
future understandings of U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia security relations.  
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Aggressive Intentions as a Socially Constructed Narrative5 
 U.S. analysts, policymakers and naval officers have demonstrated a level of alarm that 
approximates paranoia towards China and Russia. An Atlantic article published in 2015 
demonstrates the rapid rise of the “assertive narrative” in U.S. media.6 Replicating the method 
used in the article, I ran a search in eight major U.S. newspaper publications for “China” or 
“Russia” and “aggressive” or “aggression” within five words of each other,7 and the following 
graph is the trend line that I traced. Undoubtedly, U.S. media has exponentially increased the 
usage of phrases such as “aggressive” to describe Chinese and Russian foreign policy behaviors, 
military or diplomatic. 
 
Figure 1. Keyword Search on Chinese and Russian Aggressiveness in Eight Major U.S. Newspapers. 
 For Russia, the major bump in the narrative of “aggressive intentions” resulted from the 
Ukrainian Crisis in late 2013, but the narrative itself has stuck with the American audience ever 
since. Observers of Russia often tie the concern for Russian aggression with a fear of Putin as an 
                                                
5 The idea for this subheading borrows Stacie Goddard’s argument in her forthcoming book, that the narrative of 
assertiveness stems from Chinese rhetoric, but is constructed and reinforced by a receptive U.S. domestic audience 
due to its own perceived vulnerabilities. Stacie Goddard, When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), forthcoming. 
6 Kathy Gilsinan, “Is China Really That Assertive?” Atlantic, October 2, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/10/chinas-increasing-assertiveness/408661/ 
7 I searched for Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York Times, the Washington Post, Los Angeles 



















incomprehensible political leader. One former Russian world chess champion, Garry Kasparov 
testified in front of Congress: “[Putin’s] goal is . . . to destroy the system of international security 
that has been created in Europe since 1945 and 1991 at the end of the cold war . . . If the free 
world vacates a space, Putin grabs it.”8 Others consider U.S. policy a failure bordering the scale 
of appeasement, when the U.S. should have boldly stood up to Russia as the villain. As the Chair 
of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa states: “For far too long, the United 
States has acted timidly in the face of increased Russian aggression. . . even though Putin, like 
other tyrants, only responds to a position of strength.”9 And congressional hearings now 
frequently have titles like “Russian Aggression in Eastern Europe,” or “Russian Violations of 
Borders, Treaties and Human Rights.” The narrative of Russian aggression is now so dominant 
that U.S. domestic actors now attach it to almost every Russian behavior in the international 
arena like a scarlet letter.  
 For China, the narrative has slowly risen since 2009 and reached new heights in 2017, 
although no tangible evidence demonstrates that China’s policy vis-à-vis disputed maritime 
territories have changed significantly.10 Congressman Brad Sherman of California once 
heroically declared: “Our entire military is looking at this as a chance to face a noble foe [China], 
a chance to be in the kind of conflict that is far less frustrating than fighting insurgencies and 
fighting asymmetrical warfare, all for some islands where our interests may be just as vital as 
                                                
8 U.S. Congress, Senate, Russian Aggression in Eastern Europe, Where Does Putin Go Next After Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Moldova?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, 114th Cong., 2015, 
23. 
9 U.S. Congress, House, Russia’s Strategic Objectives in the Middle East and North Africa: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, 115th Cong., 2017, 1 (Testimony of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen). 
10 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 
(Spring 2013): 7-48. 
		 12 
they are in every other square inch of this planet. And there is no shortage of interests.”11 The 
extent to which such rhetoric glorifies militarized confrontation against another great power is 
rather unprecedented in recent history, and suggests that U.S. reactionary policy does not just 
stem from security and strategic concerns. Such narrative assumes a certain contempt for China’s 
unethical behaviors, and a certain level of righteousness for U.S. own position. 
 In both cases, the trend lines of demonization are so similar that, I argue, there is now a 
convergence in the perceptions of Chinese and Russian aggressiveness. Every now then, 
policymakers anxiously ask the question: What can they do, “as [they] watch China reprise its 
ancient role of dominance in the East and Russia exhibit its modern version of its historic 
geographic paranoia?”12 And some are pushing back against this narrative. Observing this 
troubling trend line, a long-time expert on China and East Asian Security, Michael Swaine 
comments: “In 45 years of studying and researching China, I have never seen such a determined 
effort to depict China as an unmitigated threat. It spans agencies, news organs, and ‘belief’ tanks. 
It is inaccurate, pernicious, and contrary to US interests.”13 But such pushbacks are the minority 
voice, and the majority narrative continues to force its way into U.S. public consciousness. As a 
direct result of such narrative, the U.S. continues to increase and adjust its military investments, 
in fear of being “behind” and “losing edge” in the military technological competition vis-à-vis 
China and Russia. 
At the root of this paranoia, I argue, is an assumption of malign state intentions. 
Proponents of the “Russian and Chinese revisionism” hypothesis argue that the two illiberal 
                                                
11 U.S. Congress, House, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Sea: Joint Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces and Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House, 113th Cong., 
2014, 29. 
12 U.S. Congress. House. Game Changing Innovations and the Future of Surface Warfare: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, 114th Cong., 2015, 2 (Testimony of Bryan McGrath). 
13 Michael Swaine. Twitter Post. April 15, 2018, 7:22 PM. 
https://twitter.com/Dalzell60/status/985704966047363073 
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regimes pursue offensive buildups because they intend to undo the rule-based global governance 
and achieve great power status through coercion.14 For proponents of this argument, the 
investments in military and naval power signal a deliberate attempt to take over the current 
international order.15 For sure, the two states’ behaviors – the deployment of Russian troops in 
Georgia and the declaration of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in East China 
Sea –  only reinforce such narrative. But this does not invalidate the question of whether U.S. 
perception is justified and proportional to Chinese and Russian actions. And in order to answer 
this question, I find it necessary to investigate other potential causal mechanisms at play that 
might drive offensive buildups. 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. This is the first chapter, covering background 
context, literature review on theory, hypothesis and research methodology. The second chapter 
focuses on specific technological developments within China’s and Russia’s naval modernization 
programs, and makes the argument that these programs are highly offensive. The third chapter 
evaluates U.S. perception of offense-defense balance and relative parity in naval capabilities, two 
conditions that allow for signaling of intentions. This chapter makes the argument because there 
are offense dominance and relative parity, the U.S. in fact cannot read intentions through arms 
policies. Furthermore, offense dominance makes offensive buildup the only cost-effective way 
for states to gain security regardless of intentions. The fourth and final chapter examines how the 
naval buildups impact U.S. understanding of other ongoing issues in its bilateral relations with 
                                                
14 G. John Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign Affairs, 
April 21, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/plot-against-american-foreign-
policy. 
15 Ikenberry, “the Plot Against American Foreign Policy”; G. John Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international 
order?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January 2018): 7–23. 
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C/R. The fourth chapter concludes with ways that may help alleviate the ongoing three-way 
offensive naval arms. 
Literature Review 
The popular narrative of aggressive intentions is what political scientists and international 
relations scholars have long referred to as typologies of state as “revisionist” or “status quo.” In 
this thesis, I attempt to explain why states pursue offensive strategies through the case studies of 
China’s and Russia’s naval modernization programs. I intend to ground the case studies in a 
broader literature on states intentions, power transition theory, rational choice theory (RCT) and 
offense-defense theory. Offensive and defensive realists have long debated whether state 
intentions are knowable. Power transition theorists generally separate revisionist from status quo 
states. They define the former as those who seek to change the status quo distribution of power, 
the hierarchy of prestige, and the “rights and rules that government or at least influence the 
interactions among states.”16 The rational choice theorists argue that states are able signal their 
type – be it revisionist or status quo – through offensive or defensive arms policies, but only 
when there are offense-defense distinction, neutral offense-defense balance (ODB) and some 
balance of power between the two states. I then use the literature on offense-defense theory to 
determine what distinguishes offensive from defensive capabilities, what constitutes ODB, as 
well as what causes offense dominance. This thesis argues that even if states are dissatisfied with 
the current international system, they may not be able to credibly convey offensive or revisionist 
intentions because offense dominance makes military buildup and arms race the preferable 
                                                
16Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5-56; Robert 
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 34.  
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course of action regardless of type. Taken together, I hope to explain why intentions may not be 
the only cause of China’s and Russia’s naval modernization programs.  
State intentions are critical to determine the severity and the danger of an arms race. 
Offensive realists argue that states can never be certain about each other intentions. In this 
anarchic international environment, signaling intentions is impossible, and security dilemma is 
inevitable.17 Defensive realists are less pessimistic and stipulate that assessments of a state’s 
intentions should and have always played a key role in determining the appropriate approach 
towards that state. Defensive realists such as Robert Jervis have examined how a state’s decision 
to deploy offensive or defensive weapon systems can credibly convey offensive or defensive 
intentions, respectively.18 I find the offensive realist argument theoretically sound but of little use 
empirically. Like Thomas Schelling stipulated: “a zero-sum game is dealing with only a single 
center of conscious, a single source of decision,” with “no spark of recognition . . . [and] no 
social perception.”19 But the very premise of this project is based on the observation that U.S. 
policymakers and analysts regularly base policies on their interpretations of other states’ prior 
actions and choices. Reality does not happen in a vacuum, and in Schelling’s words, “something 
has to be communicated.”20 In this sense, offensive realism offers limited explanatory power for 
the puzzle presented in this thesis. For this reason, I adopt the defensive realist argument to the 
extent that actions can be credible signals of intentions but only under key assumptions, which I 
shall elaborate on later. 
International relations scholars have often categorized states into two types of intentions, 
status quo or revisionist, based on behaviors. Despite the centrality of intention to international 
                                                
17 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001). 
18 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167-214. 
19 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 163. 
20 Ibid. 
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politics, there is surprisingly little theoretical work done on the definitional difference between 
status quo and revisionist states. According to scholars such as Hans Morganthau, Robert Gilpin, 
Randall Schweller and the like, state leaders’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the existing 
international order critically determines whether the state is “status quo” or “revisionist.”21 Even 
when states are revisionist, the extent to which they may hope to change the underlying rules of 
the game may vary.22 Furthermore, as military capabilities are a critical factor in the international 
balance of power,23 an offensive military buildup is often associated with the more radical type 
of revisionist state intentions.24 Scholars have applied the various typologies to the rise of China, 
and arrived at different conclusions on how “revisionist” China really is. These conclusions 
depend on the likelihood or the scope of potential territorial expansion, whether one takes into 
consideration economic expansionism, and a host of other metrics.25 Regardless of specific 
definitions of revisionism, the core concept of “state type” is that fixed intentions determine 
behaviors, and behaviors demonstrate intentions. 
Rational choice theorists argue that a state can signal its type or intentions through costly 
actions, but only under certain conditions. On the role of signals to create similar social 
expectations, Schelling wrote: “Moves can reveal information about a player’s value system or 
about the choices of action available to him; moves can commit him to certain actions when 
                                                
21 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1978), 46, 74; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for 
Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), 105. 
22 For a more extensive discussion on various typologies of status quo and revisionist state intentions, please see 
Stacie Goddard, “Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order,” International 
Organization (2018), forthcoming.  
23 For a discussion on how and why military power essential to inter-state relations, See John Mearsheimer, the 
Trategy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). 
24 “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 11; Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and 
Theory,” in Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power, eds. Alistair Ian Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: 
Routledge, 1999).  
25 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for military power,” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 125-141. 
Realist scholars sometimes also argue that as states become stronger and wealthier, they naturally want more 
influence and are more willing to fight for their interests; see Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers,” 2-4. 
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speech often cannot; and moves can often progress at a speed that is determined unilaterally.”26 
Scholars commonly agree that only costly actions are credible signals of intentions. If an action 
is not costly, then actors of all types can undertake such an action. But when an action is costly, 
committing to the cost reveals a piece of information about the actor itself, its preferences, 
intentions and type. An action not in line with the state’s type will incur too great of a cost for 
the actor to undertake.27  
Furthering the logic of signaling, scholars such as Andrew Kydd and Charles Glaser 
argue that states can send signals of intentions by pursuing offensive or defensive strategies and 
technologies. Rational choice theorists argue that a state, either aggressive or status-quo in their 
type, is unwilling to adopt arms policies opposite of its type. For one, an aggressive state is 
unwilling to pursue status-quo behaviors because the state knows that military forces will shortly 
determine the outcomes of armed conflicts. For another, a status-quo state is unwilling to act 
aggressively because it leads to unnecessary conflicts and lowers its own security.28 “Status-quo 
behaviors” in the context of arms policies may include arms control agreements and unilateral 
shifts toward a more defensive posture, and “aggressive behaviors” may include actively 
building offensive capabilities.29  
Rational choice theorists also argue that the ability of a state to signal its type is highly 
dependent on structural factors. In other words, there are scenarios in which intentions cannot be 
made known or credibly conveyed. In a “separating equilibrium,” players of different types 
prefer different strategies. But in a “pooling equilibrium,” structural factors make all choices 
                                                
26 The Strategy of Conflict, 102. 
27 For the purpose of RCT, “type” and “intentions” are the same and can be used interchangeably.  
28 Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other,” Security Studie 7, no. 1 
(1997): 114-155. 
29 Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” 144. 
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equally preferable for actors of all types, which renders signaling impossible. In the first 
scenario, structural factors are set up as such that state A is able to show intentions by 
undertaking certain actions that will be too costly for actors of the other type. Players, of course, 
have to perceive the signal, and with such confidence that the signal is correct so they may act on 
the signal.30  
In order for policies and strategies to be credible signals of offensive or defensive 
intentions, three conditions must be met first: Offense-defense distinction, neutral offense-
defense balance, and relative parity in capabilities. First, states must be able to distinguish 
offensive strategies and technologies from defensive ones. Differentiating between offensive and 
defensive forces allows one side to “increase its security without menacing the other” and 
“permits some inferences about intentions to be drawn from military posture.”31 In other words, 
in order to read intentions, both the observers and the actors must be aware of the offensive or 
defensive nature of military technologies and strategies. 
Scholars have pointed to several characteristics of armaments as particularly helpful for 
offensive or defensive strategies including mobility, protection, firepower, logistics and 
communication.32 For example, Glaser and Kauffman argue that improvements in mobility are 
the most agreed-upon marker of offensive capabilities, as only offense requires the ability to 
move, attack, conquer and hold lands. A number of opponents of offense-defense theory have 
argued that offense and defense are not distinguishable even on the tactical level. 33 Contrary to 
                                                
30 The Strategy of Conflict, 100.  
31 “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 188-189. 
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It?" International Security 22, no. 4 (1998), 62. 
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1984), 219-238; James W. Davis, Bernard Finel, Stacie Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, Charles Glaser and Chaim 
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Glaser and Kauffman, Stephen van Evera argues that transportation systems such as the railroads 
that promote mobility in fact aid defense.34 Bernard Finel also points out that cavalry forces, 
despite their greater mobility, in fact favor defense because they are “expensive and hence 
limited in number.”35 Additionally, it has also been argued that mobility is even less helpful 
when it comes to the evaluation of naval forces’ offensive or defensive character, since ships are 
inherently built to be mobile and maritime territories cannot be fortified with trenches.36 Third, 
scholars have argued that contrary to popular wisdom, firepower in fact favors passive defense 
because land cover provides protection,37 and that protection can be an important characteristic 
for both offensive and defense weapons.38 Similarly, scholars have argued that logistics and 
communications may favor offense or defense depending on how they interact with the general 
force posture; for example, fixed landline in general favor defense more than portal radios.39 
Lastly, tactical capabilities may help determine the way in which states conduct and win battles, 
but outcomes of individual campaigns do not equate to outcomes of war.40 Instead, 
distinguishing between offensive and defensive tactical capabilities helps us recognize offensive 
and defensive strategies, which are potentially related to a state’s type as signals of intentions. 
Second, neither offense nor defense can be so dominant that all states are compelled to 
pursue a particular type of strategy regardless of types. The general idea of ODB, as first 
introduced by Jervis and framed in a game of prisoner’s dilemma, is that when either dominates, 
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the imbalance decreases the security gains of building capabilities of the other type.41 When 
there is offense dominance, a state will have overwhelming incentives to pursue offensive 
capabilities regardless of its actual intentions. Similarly, when there is defense dominance, 
conquest is already difficult, and small reductions in a state’s defensive forces are unlikely to 
make the state any more vulnerable.42 In either scenario, it would be in the rational and strategic 
interests of any state to invest in the dominant capability regardless of intentions. As a result, in 
order for states of both revisionist and status quo types to signal intentions, there has to be a 
neutral ODB. 
Scholars have debated the extent to which ODB can be objectively measured in the 
aggregate characteristic of all weapons capabilities on a systemic level. Theoretically, offensive 
or defensive balance points to the tendency of the aggregate weapons capabilities in an 
international system to heavily support either the conquest or the protection of territories. First, 
scholars have argued that it is very difficult, if not virtually impossible to distinguish between the 
offensive or defensive character of “all weapons, functional roles, and theaters for . . . all states 
in the system.”43 Second, while some scholars define offense or defense dominance in terms of 
war outcomes,44 others argue that this method conflates offense dominance with other variables 
such as balance of power.45 Third, scholars have also argued that although an objective ODB 
may exist, states may not perceive it before the actual use of force.46 In an attempt to address 
some of the concern raised here, I narrow down the scale of actors involved in this signaling 
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game. In my two case studies, I am treating U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China as two dyadic balances. 
Therefore, I am not examining the aggregate capabilities of all militaries in the international 
system, nor am I interested in the entire Chinese or Russian navies. Instead, I adopt the “narrow 
approach to operationalizing the balance,”47 and focus exclusively on the aggregate capabilities 
and functional roles of the Chinese and the Russian naval modernization programs. 
To the extent that the offense-defense balance exists, various scholars have attempted to 
empirically measure the balance both quantitatively and qualitatively. Underlying the ODB is the 
idea of “attack/defense ratio,” which various scholars have defined as “the ratio of relative 
resources required for offense to overcome the defense and/or take the territory.”48 In terms of 
how ODB pertains to military technology, scholars have used tactical capabilities, such as some 
of the technological characteristics mentioned above to identify advantage to the offensive. The 
quantitative approach builds on the qualitative one. Jack Levy proposes measuring the offense-
defense ratio using troop numbers,49 but troop numbers are obviously less useful for maritime 
warfare. Glaser and Kaufmann take quantitative measurement one step further and introduces 
“the compound offense-defense balance,” defined as the arithmetic product of two-directional 
balance ratios, with each one being the ratio of attacking firepower required to overcome the 
defense of the others side.50 Critics have called this quantitative approach one of reductionism 
and naked empiricism.51 For reasons in line with the criticisms, this project adopts a qualitative 
approach to measuring offense-defense balance. It allows for a more nuanced reading of tactical 
capabilities and how they translate into strategic imbalances. 
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Third, if and when one state is significantly stronger than the other state, both states will 
have a hard time signaling defensive intentions. Relative parity in capabilities is a necessary 
condition for a separating equilibrium for two reasons. For one, small reductions by the stronger 
state will not make it militarily vulnerable and cannot constitute as a costly signal of defensive 
intentions. Similarly, defensive arms policies will not make the weaker state any less likely to 
defeat the stronger state. Therefore, only when the states are relatively equal in their military 
powers and resources, small concessions can be costly enough to signal benign intentions.52 This 
suggests that if either China’s or Russia’s Navy is presently significantly weaker than an 
identified adversary, pursuing offensive capabilities is barely a sign of aggressive intentions. 
Scholars have contended that even when all three structural factors present, signaling is 
hard to achieve because concessions large enough to signal intetions will likely also drastically 
increase the signaling state’s vulnerability, and states will rarely pursue this course of action if 
they are even slightly unsure about the other side’s intentions. Signals of benign intentions also 
necessarily endanger the signaling state’s own security. A state will rarely be certain enough 
about an opponent’s response to make a large cooperative gesture, and the opponent will rarely 
be trusting enough to respond to enthusiastically to a small gesture.53 Scholars who have 
previously written about this dilemma have termed it “the basic paradox of tacit bargaining.”54 
U.S. Policymakers and analysts should pay attention to the three conditions required for 
costly signals to exist in the first place. If any or all of the conditions for the separating 
equilibrium are not met, the implication is that Chinese and Russian arms policies cannot not be 
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taken as signals of intentions. In other words, as China and Russia modernize their navies’ 
offensive capabilities, they will consider these efforts to be reactionary to structural factors and 
therefore defensive. If, however, the U.S. considers all three conditions to be present, or ignores 
to consider the conditions all the together, it would consider these programs to be indicative of 
aggressive intentions. In this scenario, the security environment might necessitate an offensive 
arms buildup for all states involved. In an offense-dominant environment, the security benefits 
generated by offensive capabilities diminish over time, and states will need to respond to other 
states’ buildups through its own further buildups, leading to an offensive arms competition. Such 
an offensive arms race is rational, because both sides see the possibility and the costs of losing an 
armed conflict.55 When there are offense distinction, offense dominance and relative power 
balance, offensive arms races are rational for both sides involved. 
A review of RCT and its conditions finds it necessary to study the empirical evidence for 
the following three independent variables: 
(1) Does offense-defense distinguishability exist in China’s and Russia’s naval modernization 
programs?  
(2) Is there a neutral offense-defense balance with regard to the territorial waters in which the 
naval assets operate? 
(3) Is there approximate parity in naval capabilities between either state and its strategic rival(s)? 
 
Based on existing literatures, I test whether RCT’s three conditions hold in the two case 
studies. RCT states that states can convey intentions through arms policies because states without 
these intentions will find this particular set of policies too costly to pursue. RCT also proposes 
three necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for the previous statement to be true. 
These conditions are: (1) offense-defense distinction in state A’s arms policy, (2) neutral ODB, 
and (3) approximate parity in naval capabilities between state A and state B. I produce the 
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following two competing hypotheses, which are summarized in two two-by-two graphs below. 
The circled outcomes indicate separating equilibria. 
 𝐻": China’s and Russia’s offensive naval buildups are indicative of intentions because the arms 
policies are distinctly offensive, there is neutral offense-defense balance in contested territorial 
waters, and there is relative parity in naval capabilities between either state and its adversary. 
 𝐻#: China’s and Russia’s naval buildups are not indicative of offensive intentions because either 
the modernization programs are not distinctly offensive, or there is offense dominance, or there 
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Neutral Offense-Defense Balance 
Parity in 
Capabilities 
Signals not possible unless states 
pursue capabilities opposite of the 
dominant type 
Possibility for signals of revisionist or 
status quo intentions 
Large Gap in 
Capabilities 
Signals not possible because arms 
buildup will not threaten the other side 
and is not costly  
Signals not possible because arms 
buildup will not threaten the other side 
and is not costly 
Table 2. Offense-Defense Balance, Relative Parity and Possibility for Signaling.56 
 
Research Methods 
By surveying secondary analysis and various databases on navies around the world, I 
measure both the independent variable of offense-defense distinction in C/R’s naval 
modernization programs, as well as the dependent variable of the two states’ offensive arms 
racing behaviors. I first examine secondary analysis available through platforms such as the 
National Interest and Jane’s 360, as well as reports recently published through congressional and 
think tank research. These reports often provide a succinct and organized narrative on naval 
technologies, with emphasis on especially notable developments. They provide a grounding for 
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more detailed and nuanced primary research. Then I cross-check the secondary literature with 
open-source databases such as globalsecurity.org, naval-technology.com as well as military-
today.com for primary, more updated and detailed research. These websites provide independent 
analysis by categories of technologies and naval vessels. To the extent that content is available, I 
also use databases such as Jane’s Fighting Ships and the U.S. Naval Institute’s Combat Fleets of 
the World. By consulting and cross-referencing these databases, I develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the levels of technological development in each category of capabilities and 
platforms. As the study is on modernization, I go back about 10 years for both countries’ buildup 
programs. 
To measure the other two independent variables – ODB and relative parity in naval 
capabilities —I use mainly congressional hearing records of several committees. I examine all 
records from Committee on Armed Services, especially from the Subcommittee on Seapower 
and Projection Forces in the 113th, 114th and 115th Congress between 2013 and 2017, excluding 
the annual defense budget hearings due to time constraints. Additionally, to understand potential 
misperception of intentions, I also access records from Committee on Foreign Relations. I then 
pull from the records all hearing transcripts that are on or related to Russia, China, Europe, Asia 
Pacific, as well as U.S. naval modernizations. I conduct keyword searches in all the texts, 
although the specific word searches are highly dependent on the topic of the hearing. For 
example, if the hearing is about U.S. naval modernization, I search for keywords like China and 
Russia. And if the hearing is about China or Russia, I use search such as nav*, A2/AD, and 
technology. If the hearing is about maintaining U.S. naval superiority, I focus on terms such as 
long-range or penetration. Another search term that proves critically useful in uncovering 
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structural factors is “require” or “requirement.” I surveyed 114 hearings in the House and Senate 
across between 2013 and 2018 in total. 
If the null hypothesis is true, I expect all three conditions to be present. First, in order for 
naval buildups to be distinctly offensive, I expect the Chinese and Russian naval modernizations 
to focus on long-range anti-ship, anti-air, or anti-submarine cruise missiles that can neutralize 
military targets at sea. Long-range firepower is less useful for near-sea defense, but is especially 
helpful for checking an adversary’s maritime push outwards, as well as facilitating one’s own 
push to access more maritime territories. Consequently, such capabilities emphasize territorial 
conquest and facilitate an offensive strategy. Second, in order for there to be neutral offense-
defense balance, I expect that the number of vessels required for China and Russia to fend off 
potential incoming attacks to be relatively equal to the number of vessels and firepower required 
for the other side. Third, I expect U.S. policymakers to consider the Chinese and/or Russian 
navies to be relatively on par with the USN both in capabilities and quantities. 
If the alternative hypothesis is true, I expect at least one of the three conditions to be 
missing. First, in order for naval buildups to be neither offensive nor defensive in nature, I expect 
that the two states invest in near-sea, small surface combatants with relatively few long-range 
cruise missiles. Similar to the logic stated above, near-sea capabilities will constrain a state’s 
zone of dominance to at most coastal defense, although short- to medium-range missiles will also 
be able to exert some level of territorial control. Second, in order for there to be offense 
dominance, I expect that the amount of firepower required for China and Russia to deny the U.S. 
access to certain territorial waters to be significantly greater than the number of vessels and 
firepower required for the U.S. to penetrate the denied areas. In order for there to be defense 
dominance, the reverse should be true. Third, if relative parity is not present, I expect U.S. 
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policymakers to consider the Chinese and/or Russian navies as significantly inferior to the USN, 
either technologically or quantitatively. 
I choose congressional hearing records for their availability and policy significance. First, 
such records are all publically accessible through the U.S. Government Publishing Office 
(gpo.gov). Second, top officers in the Navy reach the assessments based on reported naval 
combat needs of combatant commanders around the globe. The testimonies show the systematic 
prioritization or devaluation of certain capabilities vis-à-vis identified adversaries – C/R – as 
well as U.S. assessments of the relative balance of capabilities. For this reason, congressional 
testimonies are especially helpful for testing two of the three independent variables. Third, 
congressional hearings are treated as an important, if not the primary exchange of information 
between the military officers and the lawmakers who make budgetary decisions. U.S. civilian 
analysts and naval officers who testify in front of Congress do so in an effort to adjudicate funds 
on acquisition, modernization and deployment. Their rhetoric will likely carry policy 
significance.  
To assess the dependent variable of relative parity in naval capabilities, I also supplement 
congressional records and policymakers’ perception with an assessment framework on navy 
rankings. Jeffrey Issacson and Ashley Tellis of RAND built a system of naval combat 
proficiency levels based on the complexity and difficulty of missions that a navy can conduct 
(see table 4a in appendix).57 In this system, a navy can conduct nine levels of missions ranging 
from the least to the most complicated; at level I there is coastal defense, and at level IX there is 
comprehensive sea control. Accordingly, different naval vessels are built and modified for 
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specific missions, and fleets with different compositions may have varying levels of capacity to 
conduct such missions. Based on fleet compositions, Todd and Lindberg subsequently developed 
a ranking of naval capacities.58 I include this ranking in table 3 in chapter 3, in addition to 
congressional testimonies, to formally measure relative parity in naval capabilities. 
Three major limitations exist in this thesis project. The first limitation concerns my 
research on the modernization programs. While conducting research on the naval modernization 
programs, I consciously focus on combatant platforms in which states invest a relatively large of 
resources or that embody some kind of “technological breakthrough.” I had to limit my research 
simply due to the scope of this research project. Additionally, most publically accessible primary 
and secondary sources concentrate on these capabilities and platforms. As a result, I have made a 
conscious decision to not focus on modernization programs in, for example, logistical ships or 
mine sweepers. One may argue that such decision tilts my assessment of naval programs to the 
side of the offensive. I argue, however, that bigger investments represent “costly signals” on a 
tactical level, and shifts in technology have the biggest impact on offense-defense balance. I also 
argue that less firepower does not necessarily signal defensive, as we have seen from literature 
review above.  
Second, this thesis does not examine C/R’s investments in signal intelligence (SIGINT) 
and naval electronics. Scholars and policymakers have argued that investments in these 
capabilities to be rather significant and cost-imposing, which suggests that they make conquest 
harder and are mostly defensive.59 I do not investigate this aspect of technological modernization 
because such investments are often not categorized as naval modernization.  
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Third, one can argue that qualitative coding of the transcripts does not help demonstrate 
how prevalent certain ideas are, and may risk confirmation bias on the author’s part. I believe 
that quotation analysis may not be sufficient to show the universality of certain opinions, but is 
substantial enough to showcase the existence of the key independent variables. Therefore, text 
analysis is sufficient to confirm or negate the null hypothesis. I do believe, however, that 
statistical analysis may better demonstrate the level of ubiquity for some rhetoric over others. 
Quantitative analysis is beyond the scope of this research project, but may be of interest to future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2. “IF IT FLOATS, IT FIGHTS”:60  
AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S AND RUSSIA’S NAVAL 
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the capabilities that C/R are pursuing through their naval 
modernization programs. I evaluate whether offensive weaponry can be distinguished from 
defensive ones, and whether offensive tactical capabilities translate into offensive characteristics 
at the strategic level. The answers to these questions are critical to understanding the independent 
variable of offense-defense distinguishability, as well as the dependent variable of arms racing 
behaviors. To distinguish between the offensive or defensive nature of these modernization 
programs, I take a bottom-up approach by focusing on the aggregate of tactical capabilities. I ask 
whether a given navy can be used primarily for the purpose of conquering maritime territories.  
I argue that both states are engaged in an offensive arms race to deny adversaries access 
to certain maritime territories, although China does so with a much wider reach than Russia does. 
For one, the Russian surface fleet is heavily loaded with medium- to long-range cruise missiles. 
Russia has also indicated the ambition to pursue large surface vessels with impressive payload 
and tonnage, but failed due to limited funding and lack of the construction capability. In addition, 
while Russia’s subsurface fleet is much more capable, the prioritization of nuclear (SSN) over 
conventional attack submarines (SSK) suggests a focus on counter-value punishment and sea-
based deterrence as opposed to A2/AD anti-submarine warfare. China, for another, is building a 
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network of offensive capabilities that target objects at sea. This network, as often termed by 
Western analysts as A2/AD is making significant qualitative as well as quantitative strides. Like 
Russia, China also has encountered significant mechanical issues – such as naval fighters’ faulty 
engines – that may impede its naval combat readiness. Moreover, both China and Russia often 
refit their large surface combatants based on initial prototypes, building few ships per class, 
which makes repair, training and maintenance much costlier. Overall, I argue that realistic 
constraints prevent C/R’s navies from becoming full-fledged blue-water navies in the next two 
decades. Nevertheless, C/R’s modernization programs are highly offensive in nature because 
they emphasize large surface combatants equipped with cruise missiles that enable high-level 
combat and maritime push in all domains of naval warfare. 
 
Russia’s Naval Modernization Program: Why It is Highly Offensive Despite Limitations 
Russia has great ambitions for its navy. Russia’s green-water navy exhibit impressive 
missile payloads. Its blue-water surface combatant, while highly limited by domestic 
shipbuilding and fiscal constraints, have extremely high firepower-to-displacement ratios 
compared to other ship of that particular naval ship classification. And while Russia’s 
investments in submarines disproportionally focus on counter-value punishment and not A2/AD 
capabilities, ship-borne helicopters fill the role of near-sea ASW.61 Overall, the Russian navy is 
able to expand its maritime zone of dominance and achieve territorial conquest through 
systematic prioritization of firepower over hull reinforcement and significant leap in its 
capability to target adversaries at sea.  
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Russia’s surface fleet is limited in its power projection reach as a result of Kremlin’s 
long-time neglect of Russia’s domestic shipbuilding industry. Historically, the dissipation of the 
former Soviet Union dealt a huge blow to the military-industrial capability (MIC) of the newly 
formed state of Russian Federation. Not only did the post-Soviet states split up the Soviet 
military and its various assets, the failing economy and the breakup of the shipyards also 
precluded the Kremlin from making any significant naval investments in the 1990s and the early 
2000s. After Russia’s unsatisfactory military performance in the Russo-Georgian War, Moscow 
launched the State Armament Program (GPV) in late 2000s in an effort to revitalize Russia’s 
military capabilities.62 As part of the GPV, the Russian Navy was slated to receive around 26% 
of the overall funding through 2020.63 Despite steadily increasing investment in naval production 
and acquisition, the GPV has run into significant difficulties due to foreign sanctions, ruble 
inflation and lack of investment in shipyards since the fall of the Soviet Union.    
 Russia’s surface combatant acquisition programs can be roughly divided into “green-
water” and “blue-water” capabilities. The former typically includes smaller vessels such as 
corvettes and frigates – ships that the U.S. Navy generally refers to as littoral combat ships 
(LCS) – while the latter includes larger surface combatants such as destroyers, cruisers and 
aircraft carrier strike groups. Russia has been relatively successful in acquiring and modernizing 
the green-water portion of its naval fleet. The Russian Navy is acquiring two main classes of 
frigates and five new classes of corvettes, and improving its designs with every new class. 
Russian naval planning envisions Steregushchiy corvettes, Gorshkov frigates and Grigorovich 
frigates to replace Soviet-era vessels and become the backbone of the Russian fleet for the next 
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two decades.64 Some other classes have more specific designs. Buyan corvettes, for example, are 
designed for shallow waters and river mouths, where they can deliver troops to land.65 Not only 
have these green-water projects acquired impressive firepower, the Russian Navy also often 
redesigns ship models to add more firepower and tonnage. This leads to the impression that the 
ships tend to have a significantly stronger firepower than other ships of that particular naval ship 
classification. 
Despite common misconceptions about a green-water surface force’s limited reach, 
Russia boasts an impressive upgrade for its green-water vessels’ offensive capacity. Offensive 
firepower on the green-water surface vessels comes in two folds. For one, Russia’s new frigates 
and corvettes carry a combination of anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-air short-range missiles. 
These missiles can have ranges as low as 1km and as high as 150km. The anti-air missiles aboard 
many of these new vessels, such as Steregushchiy, have advanced technical characteristics such 
as active radar honing seekers that allow for mid-air tracking and higher maneuverability.66 
What’s more, Gorshkov will also be the only new combat ship in Russian Navy compatible with 
Brahmos missile. Brashmos is a supersonic cruise missile with a maximum range of 290km. The 
missile is capable of hitting both ground and sea targets traveling at an altitude as low as 10m 
and at three times the maximum speed of the U.S.-made Tomahawk missiles.67 In modernizing 
its near-sea fleet, Russia fills up the maritime areas along Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea coastal 
zones with highly offensive capabilities aboard its corvettes and frigates.  
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Russia is also attempting to field more far-sea surface vessels, including larger surface 
combatants such as destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers. The Russian Navy currently has 
only one operational aircraft carrier, the 28-year-old Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov is scheduled to enter 
into a 3-year overhaul starting in 2018, because of what some may describe as “questionable” 
performance off the coast of Syria due to poor maintenance and a lack of trained staff.68 For 
example, the ship had a visible trail of black smoke as it sailed due to problems in the boiler-
pressure propulsion system.69 There are two new designs of aircraft carriers in the pipelines as 
successors to Kuznetsov: One is a massive 100,000-ton, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier named 
Shtorm, and the other one light multipurpose aircraft carrier (LMA). Neither project has a 
realistic construction timeline at the moment. The contracted shipbuilder has also begun the 
construction for Lider, a guided-missile destroyer that can be up to 17,500 in tonnage and way 
past the displacement of what is normally categorized as destroyers.  
New far-sea vessels like Shtorm and Lider are so ambitious in their designs that they 
mirror the Soviet tsar bomb – a weapon of almost excessive firepower and a symbol of the Cold 
War nuclear arms race. First, Shtorm is a massive, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The vessel is 
designed to have four lanes of various launching systems, including both ski ramps (springboard) 
and springboard-catapulting. 70 The area of the take-off deck is rumored to be as big as three 
football fields combined.71 With no weapons systems on board, the aircraft carrier would be able 
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to carry up to 90 aircrafts and helicopters. The estimated cost for this giant ranges between 5.6 
and 17 billion dollars. Second, the Lider destroyer is so impressive on paper that “the project 
may reflect a desire to surpass the American DDG-1000 Zumwalt.”72 Analysts have looked at 
Lider’s projected capabilities and called it a cruiser under disguise. If built successfully, the 
destroyer would carry over 200 missiles, including long-range anti-air and anti-submarine cruise 
missiles, along with 2 helicopters and a 130-mm gun. One source speculates: “Project 23560 
[Lider destroyer] could well be remembered in the future as the ‘Tsar Destroyer.’”73 Both Lider 
and Shtorm have been indefinitely delayed for reasons that I will elaborate on later. By 
attempting projects of such outsized ambition, Russia is clearly engaging in a behavior of 
offensive arms race. 
What’s more, Russia is building vessels with higher and higher firepower-to-
displacement ratio. Russia’s domestic shipbuilding industry lacks the technical expertise for 
large ships, but Russia has figured out that it does not need much tonnage to build more 
firepower and missiles on a ship. In the past, naval classification of ships largely depends on the 
vessel’s overall tonnage because weight determined the amount of firepower that could be 
loaded. But this is no longer the case. Russian vessels often integrate families of pre-packaged 
weapons systems. Michael Kofman, an expert on Russian military, nicely summarizes the 
families of capabilities: “These [capabilities] include vertical launching system (VLS) cells with 
[cruise missiles], Pantsir-M for point defenses, Redut VLS cells for air defense, and Paket-NK 
anti-torpedo systems. Larger ships carry Poliment-Redut air defense, phased array radar and be 
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more versatile in the roles they can perform.”74 VLS, in particular, is a firepower technology that 
significantly improves the number of missiles ready to be fired at any given moment. In sum, 
these ships are built for firepower, not durability or survivability. In fact, the contractors and 
naval planners who put them in place probably consciously sacrificed the weight that would 
normally come with hardened hull in exchange for such a bargain on the firepower price. 
The Russian Navy also has a tendency to build ships that are much larger and overweight 
compared to other ships in that class. The Navy tends to construct prototypes – which are already 
equipped with mid- to long-range cruise missiles – gradually modifies and adds more 
displacements to specific models, making them bigger and bigger. This was the case with 
Steregushchiy (project 20380) and Buyan (project 21630). Steregushchiy’s and Buyan’s  
prototypes already carry SS-N-25 and SS-N-27 cruise missiles and weigh 2,200 and 500 tons, 
respectively. Only one vessel for each initial model was built, and all subsequent designs were 
significantly modified. Gremyashchiy (project 20385) and Derzky (project 20386) derived from 
Steregushchiy, but have added weights of 2500 and 3400 tons instead. Similarly, project 
21631—the missile-variant of Buyan –carries more advanced weaponry and electronic 
countermeasure systems than Buyan. The modified variant weighs 950 tons, almost double the 
weight of the prototype. Generally speaking, the constant upgrading and redesign give ships 
significantly more firepower. As a result, the ships are often superior to other ships in that 
particular classification, which makes arbitrary ship classification not only useless but also 
potentially misleading. 
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On the submarine front, Russia is currently replacing some of the older models in its 
submarine fleet, as well as consolidating its existing fleet into a few new models. Russia enjoys a 
much stronger technical know-how in its undersea than its surface force. Russia is currently 
constructing two classes of diesel-electric attack submarines, Lada and Varshavyanka, as well as 
two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines, Borei SSBN and Yasen guided nuclear 
submarines (SSGN).75 Borei and Yasen will replace retiring models such as the Deltas,76 while 
maintenance and upgrading efforts occur on some other models. Moreover, Russia is also 
building a new platform, tentatively named Husky, that will have the three variants of basic 
attack submarines, ballistic missile and guided missile submarine. Because Husky is still under a 
conceptual phase, the public currently has very little information about the much-anticipated 
fifth-generation submarine’s capabilities. 
Russia’s desperate need to replace its aging fleet drives the construction of the four 
models of conventional and nuclear submarines currently in production. As it stands, nearly 75% 
of Russia’s 61-vessel submarine fleet are over 20 years old.77 However, the costs associated with 
keeping many of these aging vessels in active service are extraordinarily high because Soviet 
submarines were not designed for upkeep or upgrading. As a result, Borei and Yasen have been 
long been in the production as an effort to slowly phase out the older vessels. These projects, 
particularly Yasen, have proven to be astronomically expensive. In their place, the SSK offers a 
cheaper alternative with decent firepower-to-ruble ratio.  
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Russia is still heavily investing in its sea-based nuclear deterrent, although some analysts 
agree that SSKs seem to be a better buy for anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare. On the one 
hand, Russia is expected to build a total of 14-20 SSKs as part of the GVP-2020.78 Russia is 
currently building 2 new classes of conventional submarines: Lada and Varshavyanka. While 
Lada significantly behind schedule and unlikely to be completed due to Ukraine-related 
sanctions,79 the shipbuilding yard will hand over six Varshavyanka (improved Kilo submarines) 
to the Black Sea Fleet in 2019, with another six being built for the Pacific Fleet by 2022.80 
Russia’s domestic shipbuilding industry can produce Varshavyanka in 18 months pretty 
comfortably, both materially and fiscally. Both Lada and Varshavyanka carry long-range land-
attack cruise missiles; they can also launch variations of anti-ship and anti-submarine guided 
missiles. Lada is also fitted with air independent propulsion (AIP) systems, a design that makes 
SSKs as quiet as some SSNs.  
On the other hand, Russia has also been spending a disproportionally large amount of 
resources on its sea-based deterrent, the nuclear-powered submarines. The Russian Navy expects 
around 8-10 ballistic-missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) as part of the GVP-2020.81 Yasen is a 
nuclear-powered multi-purpose submarine that packs 24 cruise missiles, including nuclear 
warheads, 8 torpedo tubes, as well as mines and anti-ship missiles. Borei is Russia’s fourth-
generation nuclear submarine, significantly smaller and costs only one fourth of what Yasen 
does.82 Borei can carry up to 16 Bulava SLBMs, capable of carrying 6-10 re-entry vehicles with 
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a yield of 100-150kT each. On multiple occasions, Russia has suspended Yasen construction 
projects and prioritized funds for Borei as a cheaper alternative. 
Consistent with the prioritization of nuclear submarines, Russia is also about to begin 
building the fifth-generation submarine that will consolidate Russia’s disparate SSN, SSBN and 
SSGN into an open-module design.83 Many have compared this “open-module” approach to the 
U.S. Virginia-class submarine, which has a SSBN and potentially also a SSGN variants derived 
from the initial SSN design.84 Envisioned to be cheaper and smaller, Husky will likely 
incorporate the experiences and lessons from the two-and-half-decade struggle otherwise known 
as Yasen. Although construction of the project is not likely to begin any time before 2023-
2024,85 there is no obvious reason why the Husky program would be significantly delayed. 
Russian submarine construction has been doing relatively well – compared to aircraft carriers, 
for example – and technologically, Husky should not encounter too many difficulties.86 That 
leaves funding to be the main potential cause of concern. Russia currently has 12 submarines 
planned or in construction. It is likely that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) may cancel 
or further delay older programs like Yasen in order to prioritize the timely construction of the 
cheaper derivative. 
I argue that Russia’s focus on nuclear-powered submarines – as opposed to the cheaper 
diesel-electric ones – shows that Russia envisions long-range deterrence to be the primary 
function of its submarine fleet. For one, a nuclear submarine’s biggest functionality is its 
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endurance and survivability: Nuclear-powered submarines are able to remain submerged for long 
periods of time, or patrol alongside another state’s coast without being discovered.87 In an order 
of battle, SSNs are likely the last ones to engage. Because of its stealth feature, submarines are 
highly survivable tools of nuclear deterrence, but are not the most cost-effective tools for coast 
defense and A2/AD. For another, if Russia had wanted to use its submarine fleet for ASW and 
A2/AD operations, conventional submarines would do the job at a much lower cost. As 
described above, a large portion of missiles aboard nuclear submarines is nuclear warhead 
delivery vehicles. Although sometimes such vehicles can also deliver anti-ship or anti-submarine 
missiles, this is usually less often the case. And because deterrence relies on counter-value 
punishment rather than neutralization of another’s offensive capacity, I argue Russia’s submarine 
fleet is not part of the offensive race engaged in its surface fleet.  
On the naval aviation front, Russia is heavily investing in anti-submarine capabilities, 
although the progress is limited by its lack of aircraft-carrying, sea-going vessels. Most of 
Russia’s naval aviation aircrafts are land based. Russia’s only aircraft carrier, Kuznetsov’s 
relatively short deck limits the weight of the aircrafts that could take off. The Russian Navy is 
gradually replacing SU-24 with SU-30SM, a multi-role attacker-fighter aircraft, capable of 
carrying payload of up to 8 tons. SU-30SM will likely be configured with the advanced SS-N-26 
guided anti-ship missiles, offering a significant better payload. SU-30SMs also cover a bigger air 
range, providing broader coverage of air defense. Additionally, Russia has been modernizing its 
four-decade old Ka-27 family military helicopters to a recently improved version: The latest 
antisubmarine helicopters, Ka-27M, are compatible with Gorshkov, Steregushchiy and their 
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derivatives. As such, the helicopter is fitted with armaments and radar systems designed to track 
and attack submarines. To date, 20 of these helicopters have made it into service with the Baltic, 
Northern and Pacific fleets. Lastly, Russia is also modernizing TU-142 Bear-F anti-submarine 
aircrafts, and the Il-38 May maritime patrol and submarine-hunting aircrafts.88 These 
investments signal that perhaps naval aviation is picking up part of the slack to help Russia’s 
submarine fleet conduct ASW.  
In spite of its stated ambition for highly offensive capabilities, Russia has encountered 
several major impediments in its modernization programs. Russia’s modernization program has 
been significantly behind schedule. This delay in construction is due to a variety of reasons such 
as the lack of funding and technical expertise, as well as sanction-related disruption of key unit 
imports from abroad. While sometimes these issues caused projects to be canceled or indefinitely 
delayed, other times they would simply be transferred and added to the planning of the 
subsequent GPV 2018-2025. This is, for example, the case with Gorshkov and Stereguschiy. 
Both projects are new prototypes designed to make up the new modern surface fleet, but both 
have been significantly behind the delivery schedule for 2020. It was initially expected that 20 
Gorshkov frigates will be built, with six delivered before 2020.89 Based on the current speed, at 
most 2-3 will be delivered before the deadline.90 As construction continues, projects will 
continue to carry over to GPV 2025, artificially inflating numbers down the road.91 When it 
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comes to the modernization of the surface fleet, reality often falls way short of expectation, and 
projected numbers do not hold much of a significance. 
Russia is gradually realizing the costs of its oversized ambitions. As unrealistic projects 
dragg on and costs accumulate, the MOD often delay or entirely cancel projects in an 
environment of fiscal challenges and defense sequestration. For example, in order to improve the 
Yasen submarine’s stealth, the designing bureau incorporated a variety of new features into the 
submarine, including new power supply and relocating the torpedo tubes, while maintaining the 
heavily missile payloads. The attempt to “have it all” may be the main reason why Yasen’s price 
tag stands at almost $1.5 billion per vessel. Yasen’s construction project was frequently stopped 
due to a lack of funds, once in 1996, and then again in 2003. Similarly, the contractors of the 
Lider-class destroyer designed it to be an all-powering vessel, only to realize half way through 
the process that the price tag for each of these vessels is so high –  easily exceeding about $10 
billion per ship – that Russia could hardly build even one of these ships without breaking its 
wallet. News have reported that the MOD has put both of these vessels permanently on hold. 
For another, West-led sanctions further accentuate the limitations in Russia’s domestic 
shipbuilding industry. The Russian Navy intended to build 20 Gorshkov, with six to be delivered 
by 2020. As of January 2018, none has yet made it into service following multiple delays in the 
construction program.92 The design of Gorshkov relied on gas turbine and diesel engines 
imported from Ukraine’s Zrya-Mashproyekt State Gas-Turbine Manufacturing Enterprise.93 
Ukraine discontinued the supply of these engine units following the Crimea Crisis in 2014, and 
Russia’s domestic shipyards lack the ability to produce them. Sanction-related difficulties also 
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caused the non-delivery of critical components for Steregushchiy, Gremyashchiy and Buyan class 
corvettes. Once again, sanctions led to disruption in the delivery of diesel power units from 
Germany. The sanctions went so far as to force an ending on all construction projects of 
Gremyashchiy corvettes, and the contracts will be built to Steregushchiy instead.94 Some may 
argue the non-delivery may simply be the beginning of a steep learning curve for Russia and may 
instead spur a growth in Russia’s shipbuilding industry. I argue that even if this was true, such a 
scenario would still be contingent upon sufficient infrastructure investments into Russia’s 
shipbuilding industry. In order for the Russian Navy to achieve its construction goals, the 
investments need to twice as intensive and return will be twice as delayed. At a time of such 
fiscal hardships, even Russia may think twice before diving headlong into projects with such 
dubious return on investments. 
In sum, Russia has the ambition to engage a campaign of offensive surface buildup, but is 
handicapped by the lack of funds and sophisticated MIC. Several features showcase this 
offensive buildup. For example, Russian littoral combat ships carry supersonic, highly 
maneuverable missiles that can aim targets at sea. Additionally, the Russian Navy has a tendency 
to sacrifice survivability for firepower by integrating families of weapons systems onto smaller 
vessels that do not have a high displacement. This offers a great firepower-to-price ratio and 
demonstrates the prioritization of territorial conquest. What’s more, Russia’s investments in the 
undersea fleet are largely focused on the nuclear submarine as a strategic deterrent, as opposed to 
cheaper conventional attack submarines that have a greater tactical offensive utility. This fiscal 
hierarchy indicates that Russia’s subsurface force buttresses the Navy’s survivability and 
endurance pillars, but not its offensive capability. Russia has also encountered numerous, and 
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sometimes insurmountable challenges in its quest for a stronger navy. Most notably, Russia’s 
stagnant economy, limited domestic shipbuilding capacity and recent Ukraine-related sanctions 
have impeded Russia’s modernization programs. By separating the ambition from realistic 
restraints, I demonstrate that a stronger and more offensive surface fleet, coupled with a highly 
survivable nuclear sea deterrent is Russia’s heart’s desire. 
 
China’s Naval Modernization Program and the Maritime Push 
Beginning in the late 2000s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has adopted a 
more intense focus on blue-water capabilities, which gift the PLAN the unique function of 
maritime territorial expansion. For the last decade or so, China has continuously poured money 
and resources into offensive capabilities targeting other military assets at sea, such as its first-
ever anti-ship ballistic missile and more advanced carrier-based fighter jets to cover air-to-air 
combat. This surge became especially conspicuous in the period between 2005 and 2010, during 
which the PLAN more than doubled the total number of submarines, destroyers and frigates that 
it owned.95 Like Russia’s naval modernization programs, this strategy of A2/AD is definitionally 
offensive, as Chinese naval planning intends to retake many of the maritime territories 
previously dominated by the U.S.-led alliance network.  
In an effort to expand its maritime zone of dominance, China has built up offensive 
capabilities in all dimensions of near-sea and far-sea naval warfare. In the near-sea domain, the 
PLAN used to have no corvettes and very few frigates prior to 2014.96 Mirroring Russia’s 
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buildup of guided-missile light surface combatants, the PLAN has undergone a similar 
development. Starting in 2014, around 40 Jiangdao corvettes and 30 Jiangkai II frigates have 
entered into service, with an emphasis on neutralizing offensive capabilities coming from all 
levels of a potential maritime conflict. Both Jiangdao and Jiangkai II are fitted with anti-ship 
cruise missiles, torpedoes as well as surface-to-air missile launchers.97 Additionally, Jiangdao 
has a modified variant that emphasizes anti-submarine capabilities,98 and Jiangkai II has 
specialized weapons systems designed for surface-to-air campaign.  
In high concentration, these vessels give the PLAN the best firepower-to-price ratio. One, 
although each vessel may not so much be threatening across domains, with great numbers in a 
dense area they can generate impressive aggregate firepower that deny adversary access to all 
three domains. Additionally, it greatly benefits the fleet’s overall maneuverability, as these 
vessels, either individually or in groups, can address multi-level threats and crises around islands 
and shallow water. By fielding its surrounding waters with these light offensive vessels, China is 
engaging in a game of both qualitative and quantitative offensive buildup. 
In addition to maneuverability, the PLAN is achieving a much wider operational reach 
and the ability to project power farther away from its land mass by building up its blue-water 
capabilities. Large guided missile combatants such as conventional submarines, large destroyers 
and aircraft carrier battlegroups will theoretically give China the capability to operate beyond the 
first island chain, a privilege that China had never enjoyed. Like Russia, China experienced 
setbacks producing large destroyers early on. The lack of shipbuilding experiences necessitated a 
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long period of failed experimentation and production, which turned out to be very costly. Most 
recently, the PLAN has been producing two models of destroyers – although one of which 
probably edges on being a cruiser – as well as a new class of aircraft carriers.  
The PLAN’s blue-water offensive capabilities have reached an important marker of being 
by and large comparable to U.S. large surface combatants. Destroyers and cruisers are important 
indices against which we measure a navy’s blue-navy offensive capacity because they can 
operate individually as powerful combatants and are also necessary components of an aircraft 
carrier strike group. Many observers have compared the newer Chinese destroyers to the U.S. 
guided missile destroyers and cruisers. For example, analysts have sometimes compared the 
Luyang III destroyer to U.S. Arleigh Burke destroyer because they share similar overall 
capabilities, and Luyang III also carries phased array radars that resemble U.S. Aegis combat 
systems.99 Additionally, analysts have also compared the new Chinese Type 055 guided missile 
destroyers to U.S. Ticonderoga cruisers and Zumwalt destroyers,100 as Type 055 features 128 
VLS cells capable of carrying and launching missiles at all domains of naval warfare. The vessel 
is also around 10,000 – 12,000 tons in displacement, features combined gas and gas turbine 
propulsion (COGAG) and high-end sensor systems previously unseen on any other ship in the 
Chinese inventory.101 The Chinese shipbuilding industry also delivered Type 055 three years 
after the construction began, demonstrating a level of technical expertise that Russia can only 
dream of. China is gradually approaching the U.S. in large surface combatant capabilities, and 
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this shrinking gap critically demonstrates the state of the ongoing offensive arms race between 
the two countries. Consciously or not, China is in a competition with the U.S. to build bigger, 
faster ships that carry more missiles, in the hopes that the presence of such vessels can force U.S. 
vessels farther away from China’s mainland and as a result, push China’s frontier maritime 
boundaries outwards. 
Enabled by the development of large surface combatants, China is also fielding its first 
aircraft carrier strike groups, a marker of regional power projection. Aircraft carrier strike groups 
are highly expensive capabilities primarily for showcasing status, conducting high-end naval 
warfare, or both. China obtained its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning Type 001, from Russia.102 
Since then China has indigenously produced and reverse-engineered another one based on the 
import and launched the design of a third one. Based on the speed at which China is currently 
fielding aircraft carriers, China is likely to have multiple aircraft carrier strike groups in the 
intermediate future. Significant technological gaps still exist between Chinese and U.S. aircraft 
carrier groups, and the Chinese MOD is well aware of the technological gap between its aircraft 
carriers and those of the U.S.103 As I shall elaborate on later, it remains to be seen how long it 
will take for China to overcome the multiple technical barriers currently associated with its 
aircraft carrier programs. For example, aircraft carrier strike groups need to operate in a highly 
“informationized network” – a term frequently used by Chinese defense scholars – in order for 
multiple vessels to cooperate and fight as one entity. Nevertheless, that China even attempts to 
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build aircraft carriers is a sign of its desire to expand influence, promote China’s status in the far 
sea, and chip away at U.S. global sea control. 
In addition to over-the-horizon long-range cruise missile targeting, the large surface 
combatants also provide a platform for the development of PLA’s Naval Aviation Force (PLAN 
AF). Ship-borne aircrafts are particularly useful for intelligence-gathering, ASW and air defense. 
The PLAN AF is acquiring significant ASW and early warning capabilities through ship-borne 
helicopters in addition to carrier-based fighter jets for air-to-air combat. China currently has 
multiple destroyer- and carrier-based helicopters, such as imported KA-27M as well as 
domestically developed Z-18 and Z-18J. Z-18 has an anti-ship variant, an anti-submarine variant, 
and an intelligence-gathering variant focused on airborne early warning (AEW) systems. Z-18J 
is also an AEW helicopter.104  
What’s more, the PLAN is fielding carrier-based fighter jets with three older models, as 
well as designing and building a new fifth-generation fighter, J-31. These fighters boast great 
stealth, electronic countermeasure (ECM) jammers, as well as air-to-surface targeting 
capabilities. In particular, as a fifth-generation fighter – like the U.S. counterpart, F-35 – J-31 is 
supposed to feature “state-of-the-art avionics,” and will be compatible with aircraft carriers in the 
future. Launched by aircraft carriers’ assistive catapult systems, J-31 can provide advanced 
warfighting capabilities in close-air combat for aircraft carrier battles and much wider air defense 
coverage than ever before. The problems with such ambitious designs are, once again, technical 
limitations in Chinese naval technology, such as the lack of catapult launchers on its aircraft 
carriers as well as outdated engine designs for the fighters. As such, China claims that J-31’s 
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overall design is yet far from settled.105 China’s limited fighter engine designs together with its 
lack of functional, advanced aircraft carriers suggest that naval aviation will not be able to 
provide strong air defense beyond the immediate South and East China Seas.106 But regardless of 
realistic constraints, such modernization programs demonstrate China’s ambition to match, if not 
outpace U.S. acquisition of offensive capabilities in the air.  
On the submarine front, China is unlike Russia in that they are dispensing an equal, if not 
slightly more amount of resources on conventional attack submarines than on nuclear 
submarines. Based on statistics offered by Jane’s Fighting Ships, China has been fielding twice 
the amount of conventional attack submarines than they have nuclear submarines over the last 
decade.107 Currently, China currently has ongoing construction projects for two classes of 
submarine: Type 039A Yuan SSK and Type 094 Jin SSBN.108 Rumors speculated that China 
launched a SSK, Type 032 Qing, in 2012 as a platform for testing SLBM,109 and will soon begin 
the production of next-generation Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN.110 
I argue that China is fielding more conventional than nuclear submarines because they have 
greater firepower-to-price ratio. Conventional submarines offer a great package of stealth and 
warfighting capabilities. For one, like the Russian Lada submarines, Yuan SSK is reportedly 
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equipped with AIP, based on Chinese sources.111 AIP is a maritime propulsion technology that 
drastically reduces the acoustic signature of a conventionally powered submarines, so much so that 
these conventional submarines are potentially harder to detect than nuclear submarines. AIP also 
increases the submarines’ endurance from days to weeks.112 For another, Yuan is mainly equipped 
with YJ-82113  – a domestically produced submarine-launched anti-ship missile – but is also 
capable of launching several types of Russian anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes, 
including the supersonic 3M-54E Club anti-ship missiles.114 In other words, the difference in the 
price tags of an SSK and an SSN –the former is in the millions of dollars, while the latter is in the 
billions of dollars – buys significantly longer endurance and the option of nuclear deterrence. The 
continuous investments in SSKs can only be because of the emphasis that China places on near-
sea conventional combat, where SSNs would be of little value. 
This is not to say that China has not heavily invested in its growing sea-based nuclear 
deterrence. In addition to the two classes of diesel-electric submarines, China finished the 
construction of its first ever sea-based nuclear deterrence, type 094 Jin SSBN and is likely 
secretly building the next-generation type 095 SSGN and type 096 SSBN.115 Jin mounts 12 JL-2 
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missiles,116 a model of SLBM with approximately 8000 km in range and can carry 3 to 4 
multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRV) of 90-kiloton (kT) nuclear warheads each or one 
warhead with a yield of 250-1000 kT.117 Jin is the first of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrence 
that can actually hold the continental U.S. at target even when parked in China’s home waters. 
Additionally, a DOD report to the Congress in 2010 states that China is likely to field type 095 
Sui SSGN and type 096 Tang SSBN in the coming years,118 although no definitive sources 
confirm this. The highly secretive type 095 and type 096 nuclear submarines are likely to feature 
improved stealth features. When officially in service, Sui will likely fill the long-distance anti-
ship and anti-submarine targeting role, while Tang will be bigger, heavier and carry more 
missiles but otherwise of a conventional design. As previously mentioned, China had constructed 
a conventional submarine for testing JL-2 SLBM, but the fact that it continues to develop new 
SSNs demonstrates strong interests in building a stronger sea-based nuclear deterrence. While 
this does not necessarily signal a departure from China’s minimum deterrence posture, China is 
certainly showing interests in modernizing and upgrading its nuclear deterrence posture. 
As in the case of Russia, China had previously ignored the development of surface, 
undersea and naval aviation technologies for a long time. This negligence led to many technical 
constraints on the pace at which China can modernize its navy. First, in the PLAN’s surface 
fleet, China has yet to build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which makes the Chinese aircraft 
carriers significantly slower than the U.S. ones. China’s aircraft carriers also only have ski ramps 
and have yet to incorporate catapult launchers, which lowers the maximum take-off weight of the 
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aircrafts aboard these aircraft carriers. Without catapult launchers, China’s carrier-based fifth-
generation fighter will mostly be a dream. Moreover, outdated engine designs significantly limit 
China’s naval aviation program. Simply put, China has the technical expertise to build the 
skeleton and the skins of a “fifth-generation” fighter but not the heart. While Chinese fighters’ 
software and stealth features may be on par with the other fifth-generation fighters out there, the 
aircraft’s engine design is likely based on the Klimov RD-33 – a Russian engine design from the 
1980s – and far behind the standard of what would be considered the engine of a “fifth-
generation fighter.”119 Lastly, China is still far behind in its nuclear submarine stealth 
technology. ONI suggested in a report that the two newest classes will have higher noise level 
than the Russian Akula I level.120 Akula I is a Soviet-era submarine gradually being 
decommissioned.  
Additionally, China is still working to overcome its reliance on imported military 
technology from Russia and elsewhere. Historically, China has relied on Russia to acquire high-
end naval capabilities. For example, China purchased the porotype of its first aircraft carrier from 
Russia; its fighter’s engines are based on imported Russian models; this is not to even mention 
the multitude of Russian missiles on Chinese vessels.121 Reliance on foreign imports poses a 
major challenge for the rise of Chinese military power, like when sanctions-related non-
deliveries heavily delayed and impeded Russia’s ship construction projects. Currently Sino-
Russian relations is experiencing one of the warmest periods in history. However, short of a 
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military alliance, Russia will always be wary of significant imbalances of power. As China 
continues to harness its military power, Russia will likely remain cautious about further military 
exports to China. This will likely facilitate a slowdown in the growth of China’s naval 
capabilities.  
Lastly, a common problem with both the Chinese and the Russian larger surface 
combatants is the need to experiment and alter. Smart naval development strategy entails 
building a lot of vessels within a few concentrated class, like what China has been doing over the 
last few years with its corvette program. Having more ships of the same class helps keep 
research and development costs at bay. The first few vessels in a class are usually the most 
expensive, as major technical modifications usually follow the construction and trials runs of the 
first vessel. It also requires time and significant training for technical staff to learn both the 
operations and maintenance of a specific model. This is, simply put, “the economy of scale.” 
However, because of the lack of expertise, experimentation is sometimes required to find the 
model that best suits the navy’s need, whether in combat or otherwise. When it comes to their 
destroyers, for example, Russia and China both went through a period where they built no more 
than two or three vessels in a class before deciding against the project. This was the case with 
Chinese type 051B Luhai, type 052A Luhu and Type 052B Luyang I. And this is largely the 
cause of the abandoned Russian projects such as Yasen. As Chinese and Russian naval 
technologies mature, the “learning curve” will likely lessen and lead to less diversity in their 
large surface combatant classes.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that both China and Russia are heavily investing in offensive 
capabilities that allow for denying adversaries access to a particular maritime territory. For one, 
China has consistently and significantly improved its anti-air, anti-ship and anti-submarine combat 
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capabilities, so much so that some – but not all – of its larger surface combatants have become 
peer competitors of U.S. vessels. For another, lacking the resources to produce large vessels, 
Russia has made the conspicuous decision to trade protection such as thicker hulls for offensive 
firepower. Additionally, it is important to note that some, if not most of the technological 
challenges discussed here are part of the natural process in military modernization. They should 
help observers evaluate the realistic constraints placed on China’s and Russia’s ambitions. The 
Russian and the Chinese Navies have both undergone a period of neglect. Their capacity to 
modernize and acquire are limited, first and foremost, by the lack of a strong foundation. But one 
should not mistake capacity, or the lack thereof, for capabilities. After all, we may not achieve 
what we want at the present, but not achieving the goals does not make us want them any less.  
Does this mean that the U.S. should be justifiably alarmed by the intentions behind signs 
of improvements in China’s and Russia’s naval modernization programs, and therefore accelerate 
its own naval modernization and acquisition? Not necessarily. In the next chapter, I will test the 
other two necessary conditions for rational signaling. In addition to the fact that China and Russia 
are engaging in regional naval arms race, U.S. strategy of global dominance, and as well as its 
perception of China and sometimes Russia as an overall peer competitor both serve as a basis of 
justification for an offensive arms race. 
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CHAPTER 3. “WE DO NOT NEED ANYBODY’S PERMISSION”:  




In this chapter, I show that as a naval superpower, the U.S. Navy (USN) has an 
overarching strategic concept of global access and sea control. Sea control endows upon 
maritime areas political and military significance, in addition to the economic resources they 
already embody. Previous scholars have treated ODB as a variable that is different in maritime 
warfare than in land warfare. However, I argue that maritime warfare has many of the similar 
characteristics as land wars do today, except that they cannot be fortified and are more easily 
conquered than guarded. Since sea areas cannot be fortified, ensuring qualitative and quantitative 
offensive superiority in a match-up of naval capabilities is the structural requirement and one 
major way to impose costs on one’s adversaries. To protect its global presence and deter 
challengers, therefore, the U.S. must continuously invest in offensive capabilities at a higher rate 
than its potential adversaries do. As China and Russia push outwards for control over more of 
their surrounding maritime territories, the structural environment in these territorial waters 
becomes highly contested and offense-dominated.  
In addition to the offense-dominant environment, I demonstrate that U.S. lawmakers and 
naval war planners have perceived Chinese and Russian navies as near-peer competitors in their 
surface and subsurface capabilities, respectively. The perception of near-peer competition, in 
turn, is a key cause of U.S. perceived vulnerability and offensive naval buildups for denial 
penetration capabilities. As the United States adjusts its naval force postures worldwide to 
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address these challenges, C/R’s modernization programs raise the costs of conventional 
deterrence for the U.S. both locally and globally. Therefore, however regional they may be at the 
moment, the rise of C/R’s navies directly threatens U.S. global sea control and upends the 
American maritime empire. Ultimately, I argue that offense dominance and the perception of 
“peer competition” jointly explain the onset of a rational offensive arms race because in an effort 
to gain security and military advantage, all states must pursue highly offensive capabilities to 
make the most cost-effective investments regardless of actual intentions.  
 
Maritime Territoriality as the Foundation for Conquest and Offense Dominance 
As I show in chapter 1, the logical link between territoriality and ODB is extremely 
controversial in academic debates, because it equates offense with the ability to move and 
conquer land.122 With regards to maritime warfare specifically, scholars have also advanced the 
view that discussions on land offensive/defense military technologies are generally not 
applicable to naval warfare. Scott Sagan, for example, argues that “it has been generally 
recognized since Clausewitz that defense is almost always ‘easier’ in land warfare because of 
advantages of cover and the capability to choose and prepare terrain and fortify positions.”123 In 
an excellent overview of how the concept applies to maritime warfare, Jack Levy points out that 
“movement toward enemy forces and territory is much less useful for naval warfare.” He argues 
that navies cannot be distinctly offensive, as one cannot apply “the principles of mobility and 
tactical movement to naval warfare,” and navies can always avoid battels by retreating and this 
would not sacrifice major territorial objectives. The lack of costs for retreat demonstrates “the 
absence of anything comparable to the territorial standard occurring in land warfare.”124 
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I would like to contest the argument that defeat of enemy forces and territorial conquest 
are not linked in naval warfare. In fact, I argue that in the present day, navies cannot retreat in a 
battle without sacrificing major political and military objectives, which makes the so-called 
“territorial standard” central to naval warfare. One major characteristic that previously 
distinguished land from maritime territories was the presence and protection of population and 
industrial assets, but such distinction no longer exists. Maritime territories today have inherent 
economic values, and states often endow political and military significance to these territories as 
well. Despite having no human or industrial assets, maritime territories have trade routes, natural 
resources and undersea cables. It is well-known, for example, that the South China Sea (SCS) 
carries almost one third of the world’s global shipping.125 Those who have guaranteed access to 
the area, therefore, have secured trade routes and economic rights. This is not to even mention 
the economic benefits that come out fisheries and other natural resources in the area. But 
economic significance is not the only nor the most significant factor that gives maritime 
territories meanings. States often bestow political and nationalist significance upon contested 
maritime areas. Like land territories, the ownership of certain maritime regions completes 
national sovereignty and has added political benefits to a regime.126  
C/R’s area denial strategies and U.S. global sea control manifest the territorial nature of 
maritime warfare today. For China, for example, monopolized access to maritime territories in 
South or East China Sea means that the PLAN can push potential armed conflicts farther away 
from its landmass and protect its population and commercial centers.127 For Russia, ensuring 
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naval access to the Black Sea and beyond will protect the contested territory of Crimea.128 For 
the U.S., the use of aircraft carriers strike groups “resembles an island-hopping campaign . . . 
[where] pieces of the ocean will be seized and held for some period of time from which offensive 
operations are then conducted.”129 In other words, offensive warfare necessitates seizing and 
using maritime territories as a forward-deployed base to launch combat missions. Without the 
ability to deploy forward, U.S. ability to fight an all-domain war will be significantly diminished. 
When maritime territories are contested and have heavy military presence, a state has a much 
harder chance defeating enemy forces without seizing territories, and cannot seize territories 
without defeating enemy forces. 
Maritime territoriality provides a foundation for offense dominance – the tendency to 
conquer – because in contested territories, all involved parties will heavily employ technologies 
and strategies that ensure access and conquest, for the lack of a better word, of the given 
maritime territory. The key distinction between territorial conquest and territorial defense is the 
status quo ownership over a particular territory. In other words, territorial conquest entails 
gaining access and ownership over another entity’s territory, while territorial defense entails 
ensuring access and ownership over one’s own territory. Although the legal ownership of 
contested sea areas such as SCS and Black Sea is beyond the scope of discussion for this project, 
it is widely understood that such waters are not exclusively under one state’s sovereignty in the 
same way that for example, a state or a republic may belong to China, Russia or the U.S. In an 
environment where no party can claim legitimate ownership over a given territory, every party is 
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on a mission to conquer.   
U.S. Global Sea Control and Offense Dominance 
Global sea control and all-domain access are overarching U.S. naval strategic concepts.130 
U.S. policymakers, therefore, consider them non-negotiation and non-questionable national-level 
guiding objectives. I argue that global sea control and forward-deployed U.S. vessels create 
offense dominant environment in Western Pacific and Eastern Europe for two reasons. 
Technologically speaking, maritime territorial defense limits naval vessels’ mobility and subjects 
them to easier targeting by technologically sophisticated cruise missiles. As the missiles are 
significantly cheaper than the vessels, offense and territorial conquest require less costs and 
firepower than territorial defense does. Geographically, unlike land warfare, the maritime 
geography provides natural cover for attack submarines that can launch surprise attacks and 
provide penetration against C/R’s A2/AD capabilities. Ultimately, I argue that offense 
dominance compels all states, including C/R, to pursue offensive capabilities because access 
denial requires a high concentration of firepower to offset U.S. offensive advantages and 
penetrating strike capabilities. 
The concept of global sea control requires the deployment of U.S. naval vessels 
worldwide to ensure U.S. access to every corner of the world’s oceans. “Sea control” denotes a 
condition in which a state’s navy can successfully exercise the full range of operations in all 
domains, including undersea, surface, air and electronic.131 U.S. policymakers and naval officers 
consider U.S. “command of the commons” as critical to the provision of public goods – namely, 
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freedom of navigation (FON) – that currently underpin the global maritime order. Assistant 
Secretary of Navy, Sean Stackley spells out the range of the USN’s missions geographically and 
thematically:  
 Today … nearly half of [the Navy] is routinely underway . . . from the Eastern Med 
[Mediterranean] to the Sea of Japan to the South Atlantic and points beyond . . . They are 
the providers of maritime security around the world. They are our first responders to 
crisis, in the aftermath of natural disaster to provide relief, in the face of regional turmoil 
to weigh against aggression, and when called into action to defeat our foe. They are our 
surest defense against the threat of ballistic missiles and they are the Nation’s surest 
deterrent against the use of strategic weapons. Their effectiveness in providing stability is 
a product of their presence, their response time, and their ability to project power.132 
As shown in the quotation here, the provision of public goods such as maritime security may be 
an added benefit. But the real function of global sea control is military access to all of the 
world’s maritime areas where the U.S. has vested interests, so that when conflicts draw near, the 
USN is combat-ready and combat-effective against all potential adversaries. For that reason, 
global sea control is merely a benevolent equivalent of global maritime conquest.    
 Access requires naval superiority, and to gain access to maritime territories under U.S. 
global sea control, the two states must pursue naval buildups to offset U.S. naval presence in the 
region. For the previous two decades, the U.S. has maintained global maritime access through 
naval superiority. Starting from 2010 or so, R/C have replicated the American recipe for 
territorial dominance. To this move American policymakers have vehemently objected, 
essentially citing U.S. hegemony as the only legitimate form of maritime domination. While 
China may have “a very expansive interpretation of . . . exclusive economic zone (EEZ)” and 
want to “control the military activities within it,” retired U.S. Admiral Dennis Blair declares, 
“but more important than whether we run a particular destroyer within 3 miles or 4 miles of a 
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particular rock . . .  is that the United States freely operates its air, naval, and, if necessary, its 
ground forces in that part of the world. And we do not need anybody’s permission to do it.”133 
R/C’s naval modernization programs essentially strengthen the two states’ capabilities, on both 
the high-end and the low-end, as the only way to ensure their own access to the near-sea 
contested maritime territories. Under U.S. global sea control, the competition over access 
necessitates a matchup in naval capabilities, leading to C/R’s naval arms racing behaviors. 
 Furthermore, I argue that offense dominance compels naval buildups to be highly 
offensive regardless of intentions, as the amount of firepower that C/R must build in order to 
neutralize American offensive capacity significantly outweighs the amount of firepower required 
for the U.S. to penetrate the denied area. Almost all naval capabilities are tactically offensive, 
that is to say, they are highly mobile and have firepower that can neutralize an adversary’s fleet. 
But there are external technological and geographical factors that place strategic offensive in a 
more favorable position than strategic defensive. As scholars have previously argued in the 
literature, offense-defense balance is a two-directional compound ratio comprised of (1) the cost 
effectiveness associated with successful defense, and (2) the cost effectiveness associated with 
successful offense. I define the first one as the ratio of costs required for the defender to 
neutralize the offender’s firepower capacity – the requirement for a defensive victory. And I 
define the second one as the ratio of costs required for the offender to overcome the defender’s 
firepower capacity – the requirement for an offensive victory.  
 Offense dominates the naval standoffs between C/R and the U.S. because the requirement 
for a defensive victory is much higher than that for an offensive victory, which makes territorial 
conquest is much less costly than territorial defense. For example, consider the following 
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testimony by Dr. Andrew Erickson of U.S. Naval War College: 
To be sure, both U.S. SSNs and long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM) and Chinese 
A2/AD forces could achieve denial effects. Long-range surface-to-air and air missiles 
from both sides might hold air operations over the features in question at risk, prevent 
continuous operations, or even fully create a no man’s land. U.S. forces other than SSNs 
might not be able to operate without assuming great risk and hence be denied unfettered 
access. But Chinese forces would also not have access and would thereby be denied their 
objective of seizing and holding disputed territory.134 
In other words, offensive capacity, including A2/AD capabilities, by either side could deny the 
other side access to a particular maritime area but cannot guarantee access to one’s own. 
Essentially, one side can easily seize an area but cannot fend off attacks against potential assets.  
The sheer operational difficulties associated with defense speaks volume to the offense 
dominance within these territorial waters. 
Attacking is much easier than defending a maritime region because the ocean provides 
cover for surprise attacks, and long-range cruise missile technology disadvantages the side with 
limited mobility, as mobility is one of naval vessels’ greatest natural defense against incoming 
attacks. For one, the maritime geography provides natural cover for stealthy attack submarines 
that are particularly useful for launching offensives. Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge states 
with regards to U.S. submarine attack force: “By leveraging stealthy concealment, our undersea 
forces can deploy forward without being provocative, penetrate an adversary’s defensive 
perimeter, and . . . exploit the element of surprise and attack at a time and place of our 
choosing.”135 Contrary to Sagan’s argument that land warfare always favors the defense, I would 
argue that naval warfare is always the opposite and favors offense because ocean provides a 
natural cover for vessels such as submarines, make them harder to detect and allow for a first-
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strike advantage. For that reason, conquest is much easier than defense. Some have pointed out 
that it is tautological to argue that offense dominance increases the incentive to strike first and 
the incentive to strike first demonstrates offense dominance.136 For that reason, we should not 
necessarily define offense dominance as the tendency to strike first, but instead use such 
tendency as an indication of offense dominance. In this scenario of maritime warfare, it is the 
natural geography that puts first-strike in a favorable position and indicates offense dominance. 
Technological factors also favor conquest because long-range precision-guided missiles 
are the predominant method to neutralize incoming firepower from the other side. For example, 
concerning U.S. long-range cruise missiles, Mr. Bryan Clark of the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) says: 
If I shoot 10 or 12 Tomahawks at [high-end Chinese destroyers], they may not shoot all 
of them down; all it takes is one to get through. . . If I am paying for 10 or 12 Tomahawks 
at about a million dollars apiece to destroy a $1.5 billion or $2 billion Chinese destroyer, 
that would be a good tradeoff to accept.137  
Mr. Clark’s implied logic here is a rational trade-off calculation. An adversary’s large 
combatants have inherent firepower that can attack U.S. vessels, and the cheapest way to offset 
firepower is by liquidating them, not by building thicker hulls on our part, although reinforced 
hulls may certainly help. As navies can now easily target adversaries across long distance, 
striking first helps disarm the other side and minimize damage to oneself. Therefore, those who 
operate within a confined maritime territory are particularly subject to high-density incoming 
missile attacks. The more long-range and precise these missiles are, the more they aid conquest 
and the less they help with defense. J. Randy Forbes, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Seapower and Projection Forces, nicely sums up the advantage of offense that natural cover and 
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long-range cruise missile technology offer: “I think that our Navy needs to place more emphasis 
on undersea warfare and long-range power projection as part of a strategy to prevent potential 
adversaries from achieving the benefits offered by anti-access/aerial denial strategies.”138 Taken 
together, the technology and the geography are such that offense has a huge advantage in naval 
warfare because of cost-effectiveness and natural cover. 
In addition to long-range missile technologies and stealthy attack submarines, low-end 
capabilities and smaller surface combatants – typically thought to be more useful for near-sea 
defense – are also integral to high-end fighting and territorial conquest. For example, the USN 
initiated the contracts for littoral combat ships (LCS), otherwise known as corvettes, only in the 
last decade or so. But even LCSs are constantly upgraded and integrated into high-end 
warfighting. Vice Admiral of the USN and Director of Navy Staff, Richard Hunt states: “For the 
initial phase [LCS is] to be in the theater and sense the environment before hostilities may occur . 
. . [LCS]s can . . . link that information back to the larger group, and she provides those unique 
capabilities in each one of the mission modules that the fleet commander would then tailor.”139 
What’s more, like Russia, the U.S. is furthering the long-range missile capabilities of smaller 
surface combatants. In the words of Admiral Harry Harris: “We used to track and be concerned 
the [Nanuchkas, Osa’s, and Tarantuls] that the Soviets had because they were missile-armed 
corvettes. And I want the Chinese and the Russians and other adversaries we might have to think 
about the LCS in that way. . . if we put the right kind of missile on it and up-gun it.” The 
integrated nature of modern naval warfare and the “missilization” of small surface combatants 
demonstrate that for all three states, the so-called distinction in wartime or peacetime deployment 
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requirements is theoretically sound but rather blurred in reality.  
Indeed, one can say that we are moving beyond verbal coercive threats and into an era of 
physical military threats. In A Model of Military Threat, Slantchev argues that a military threat is 
a physical move that (1) is inherently costly because the actor must pay to make it, and (2) 
changes the distribution of power during crisis.140 Slantchev’s conception of military threat 
describes the U.S. denial-penetration strategy – what lawmakers and naval officers consider as 
necessary for deterring China and Russia – because such strategy is costly and increases combat 
readiness. As tensions build in the Black Sea and in SCS, the USN has emphasized sending high-
end warships to the region to provide presence of warfighting capabilities, whether for the 
purpose of multilateral military exercise or otherwise. When asked how the Navy is working to 
deter Russia following the events that transpired in and around Crimea, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Derek Chollet answered: “Measures so far include . . . extending the USS Truxtun stay 
in the Black Sea to conduct exercises with Romanian and Bulgarian naval forces. We will also 
send another ship to the Black Sea within a week.”141 The two ships mentioned here are a 
nuclear-powered cruiser and an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, respectively.142 
Compared to the Black Sea, the dialogues on “deterrence through high-end capabilities” are even 
more extensive for the Western Pacific rim at the congressional level, calling for the 
deployments of specific aircraft carrier strike groups,143 destroyers,144 and attack submarines, all 
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of which can be broadly categorized as long-range, penetrating strike capabilities.145 The USN’s 
key objective is to maintain all-domain access and global sea control. However, because 
deterrence requires and reinforces offense dominance, it would then tend to elicit a reaction that 
is equally offensive in nature from the other side.  
The logic of deterrence through the presence of large surface combatants is two-fold. 
First, the A2/AD strategy is a competition of capabilities so as to raise the cost of victory and 
make conflicts less desirable for the other side in a given area. Based on this logic, naval 
capabilities should receive funding and deployment priorities if they “can substantially increase 
surface ship magazine depth and, by dramatically reducing cost per shot, substantially improve 
cost-exchange ratios against the other side’s A2/AD weapons.”146 Additionally, the presence of 
naval warships demonstrates revolve to escalate through combat readiness. Theoretically, as the 
USN prepares its navy for combat vis-à-vis an identified adversary, it can interject into conflicts 
at a shorter notice and with more intense firepower. This piece also has the additional benefits of 
alliance reassurance, which is related but not equivalent to deterrence. General Phillip Breedlove 
states that the European Reassurance Initiative (EPI) has the key components of “providing more 
rotational forces and increasing prepositioned warfighting equipment in theater,” and would 
“both assure our allies and . . . begin the movement or the changes we need to make to fully deter 
Russia.”147 The USN faces qualitative challenges in maritime areas adjacent to China and Russia, 
and perceives the strategy of offensive deterrence as the only solution to these challenges.  
In sum, offense dominates these contested maritime areas because long-range strike 
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capabilities and the maritime geography naturally put territorial conquest in a favorable position. 
For the USN, the cost for penetration is lower than defense but nevertheless climbing, as U.S. 
lawmakers work to keep up with the fiscal responsibilities required to maintain all-domain naval 
access in peace or war. Because the USN patrols globally, it uses qualitative superiority as a 
tradeoff for the lack of quantity within a specific maritime area. The technological challenges 
that C/R pose to the U.S. also affect its global deployments elsewhere, and contributes to the 
U.S. perception of China and Russia as near-peer competitors. 
Near-Peer Competition and a Three-Way Offensive Arms Race 
On a strategic level, U.S. global naval dominance is highly dependent on ensuring 
superiority in key maritime areas all around the robe. The deployment of naval combatants to 
one particularly contested maritime area more or less impacts the composition of U.S. fleets 
elsewhere due to the interlinked patrol, mission, maintenance, and retirement requirements. To 
be sure, the USN is still qualitatively superior to C/R navies in many ways. Nevertheless, the rise 
of the Chinese and the Russian Navies exerts direct and indirect pressure on USN’s deployments 
all around the world. As lawmakers and naval officers attempt to quantitatively measure the 
evasive balance in capabilities, the impact of C/R’s naval buildups on USN’s global deployments 
contributes to the perception of China and Russia as near-peer competitors in the surface and 
subsurface realms. 
 The so-called “quantitative requirement” of national-level strategic guidance captures the 
interconnected nature of U.S. naval deployment worldwide and demonstrates the ripple effect 
that the rise of a regional power may have on U.S. naval hegemony. The USN first came up with 
an estimate of the total number of U.S. vessels required “to maintain stability and freedom of the 
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seas wherever our vital interests are involved” in the 1993 DOD’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR).148 
Over the years, the USN has used the 1993 estimate as a baseline and constantly scaled up the 
number, which currently stands at 349. Congressional dialogues frequently cite this number to 
steer and evaluate strategy development and naval acquisition. Numerous factors play a role in 
this aggregate number – patrol requirements around the globe, alliance requirements due to, for 
example, multilateral military exercises, as well as ships’ expected life expectancy as impacted 
by maintenance and current usage. And the surge in one area of requirement necessarily leads to 
shortage of capabilities in other areas. 
Most recently, the quantitative estimates serve as a way for policymakers to evaluate – 
albeit not a perfect measure – not only the difference in naval capabilities between the U.S. and 
C/R but also the varying speed at which all three states modernize and acquire new “game-
changing technologies.”149 C/R’s naval modernization programs have heavily factored into the 
“deployment requirement for global deterrence” because of the urgent need to address 
“expanding requirements” with “decreasing fleet” under U.S. domestic fiscal constraints.150 It is 
important to note, however, that the Chinese and the Russian naval modernization programs pose 
challenge in different domains, that is to say, the USN may consider either navy to be a peer 
competitor in some realm but not others.  
Testimonial evidence demonstrates that through quantitative numbers, the U.S. naval 
                                                
148 U.S. Congress, House, Committee, The Future of Seapower, 4 (Testimony of John Lehman). 
149 “Game-changing technology” is the title of a series of congressional hearings that primarily look at naval 
modernizations around the world, especially that of China and Russia.  
150 Many in the congress expressed this concern. For example, Congresswoman Vicky Hartzler and Senator Randy 
Forbes in U.S. Congress, House, Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness with Limited Maintenance Resources: 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, House, 113th Cong., 2013, 15, 47; Rear 
Admiral Richard Breckenridge in U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Undersea Warfare Capabilities, p. 5-6 
(Testimony of Richard Breckenridge); as well as Mr. Bonner in U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Acquisition and 
Development Challenges Associated with the Littoral Combat Ship, 29. I am not sure what Mr. Bonner’s first name 
is, as it is not present anywhere in the transcript or online records. 
		 70 
strategists try to pinpoint the evasive balance between U.S. overall naval capabilities and those of 
the Chinese and Russian navies. Congressional witnesses frequently point out that China will 
have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants by 2020,151 and is slated to 
exceed the USN in size in 2020.152 Similarly, analysts also use numbers to measure the balance 
in capabilities between the U.S. and Russia. The Chairman of the Armed Services committee 
asks with regards to the Russian Navy: “How many ships do we have in our Navy right now?” 
To which Admiral Pandolfe answers: “Well, last time I checked, it was 287.” The Chairman 
followed up by asking: “And how many does Russia have? . . . I saw something last week that 
they had 300 ships just in the Black Sea.” Of course, Admiral Pandolfe then quickly suggests 
that quantity is only one side of the story. The key here, in the words of Admiral Harry Harris, is 
that “quantity has a quality of its own.”153 That quantitatively speaking, both the C/R navies are 
closely matching the USN contributes to the perception of the two navies as near-peer 
competitors. 
In addition to numerical measures, U.S. policymakers and naval strategists are critically 
aware that the two rising navies may be peer competitors in some realm but not others. For 
example, Director of Studies at CSBA Jim Thomas lists five areas where China has made major 
qualitative improvements: Advanced submarines, guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile 
corvettes, and naval fighter and strike aircrafts.154 At the same time, witnesses have often 
discussed anti-submarine warfare (ASW) as the PLAN’s main weakness, because “[PLAN’s] 
conventionally powered submarines . . . have a large focus on missile firing,” and based on the 
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photographs available, “the firing load-outs have a high ratio of anti-ship cruise missiles to 
torpedoes.”155 In other words, the USN has ruled out China’s ASW capabilities as a U.S. peer 
competitor. Similarly, USN primarily focuses on Russia’s submarines as the main peer 
competitor in controlling the sea from the subsurface realm. Contrary to the perception of the 
PLAN as a general threat, U.S. lawmakers and naval officers are well aware that “[Russia] is a 
land-centric force with good . . . submarines and a limited power-projection navy with only one 
aircraft carrier.”156 But the competition in the subsurface sphere is much fiercer. USN Admiral 
Richard P. Breckenridge says: “Russia and the United States use the undersea domain [as] . . . a 
global strategic lever of power. And the Russians . . . a close second with regard to their 
capability, their shipbuilding industry and the capabilities they are putting into their new classes 
of submarines.”157 As a result, the U.S. heavily focuses on Russia’s submarine fleet as the main 
peer competitor in the subsurface realm. Generally speaking, when the U.S. perceives near-peer 
competition in specific capabilities, the U.S. is much more likely to further build up and deploy 
in that realm of capabilities. 
As the U.S. adjusts to the rise of C/R navies, it becomes costlier and harder to maintain 
the U.S. global maritime hegemony in the long term. In order to address the challenges posed by 
C/R, the USN will increase the rotation and deployment of its fleets, which have significant 
implications for repair and maintenance on the road. In western Asia Pacific, the Navy “will be 
rotating more forces to the Pacific, and forward-stationing more forces in the Pacific, according 
to [Navy’s] strategy, to the point where [the Navy] will have about 60 percent of our forces 
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focused on the Pacific,” according to Admiral Matthews.158 Similarly, “as part of reassurance 
measures [against Russia], [the U.S.] has maintained a persistent presence of military forces in 
each of the Baltic States, Poland, and the Black Sea since April of [2014]. [The U.S. Navy has] 
deployed ships to the Black and Baltic Seas 14 times, and increased training flights in 
Poland.”159 For reasons previously mentioned such as deterrence, the USN has increased reliance 
on large surface combatants such as destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carrier strike groups. 
As the USN increases rotation of high-end warfighting capabilities to the European and 
the Pacific theaters, such policy also places significant fiscal burdens to speed up maintenance, 
retirement, and acquisition of U.S. high-end fleets in the long term. Take the fleet of Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyer (DDG-51) as an example. U.S. policymakers and naval officers heavily 
rely on DDG-51 guided-missile destroyers to Western Pacific, the Black and Baltic Seas for 
missions such as ballistic missile defense, ASW and more. DDG-51s’ presence provides the 
escalatory deterrence that U.S. policymakers look for to deter China and Russia because these 
destroyers are large surface combatants capable of operating independently and in conjunction 
with aircraft carrier strike groups. Due to increased usage, however, the Navy cannot help but 
also lessen the amount of scheduled maintenance and modernization work for these destroyers, 
which will then in turn shorten their expected service life expectancy to less than the expected 35 
to 40 years.160 If the USN fails to acquire more destroyers at the moment, the fleet size will 
decrease exponentially in the coming decade due to lack of maintenance and modernization, and 
the cost of acquisition will proportionally increase even further. Congressional testimonies have 
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spelled out the same logic for cruisers, aircraft carriers, as well as nuclear submarines.161 Unless 
the U.S. significantly raises its defense budget or breaks the one-third, one-third, one-third rule 
by moving budget from the other two branches of service, C/R’s offensive buildups will continue 
to exert significant pressure on U.S. long-term global dominance. For this reason, C/R’s 
modernization programs expose the inherent vulnerability of a global navy like the USN, which 
contributes to the perception of the two navies as peer competitors. 
Additionally, U.S. policymakers and naval officers treat buildups by different countries 
differently based on their current military standing. This, I argue, reflects the centrality of peer 
competition as a cause to offensive arms race. U.S. policymakers are generally aware that there 
is usually a strong correlation between a nation’s economic and military status, which rules out 
offensive intentions as the only cause for offensive buildups. For example, Dr. Patrick Cronin of 
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) states: “the trend that is driving Asian militaries 
has a lot to do with their own economic success,” and that “we want to keep pushing that 
economic success. These countries should be, first and foremost, responsible for their self-
defense. This is a positive trend.” Retired Admiral Gary Roughead agreed with the assessment: 
“What . . . the People’s Liberation Navy have done over the last few years . . . is what rising 
economies and rising nations dependent on trade do. You can go back in history, Spain, England, 
the United States, Portugal, Holland—it is the pattern.”162 This awareness of overall power 
balance, I argue, is critical to the understanding that not all military buildups harm U.S. security 
interests. When weak states pursue offensive buildups, such actions will not make them any 
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more likely to defeat the U.S. Offensive buildups are costly, in game-theoretic terms, only when 
the actor is a peer competitor, as it alters power balance, makes the rising state more likely to 
defeat the other side, and may qualify as signals of offensive intentions. Such assessments of 
overall naval power balance confirm the third condition of rational signaling theory. Namely, the 
U.S. deduces intentions based on arms policies from a potential adversary only when there is 
some level of parity in capabilities. 
In addition to perception of peer competition, a comparative framework for assessing 
navies is particularly fitting here. Todd and Lindberg previously set forth a set of ranking criteria 
in 1996, as seen below. It is important to note that any type of ranking is a generalization, and 
may miss the distinctive features of various navies’ force structures. It is nevertheless useful in 
this context to have a general framework through which we may compare different states’ naval 
capabilities.   
Based on the standards set forth here, as well as some of the challenges discussed in the 
previous chapter, it is obvious that the C/R navies are still far behind the U.S. in their assigned 
ranking. China and Russia currently fall squarely within the category of level-four navy, but their 
upward or downward development tendencies diverge. In the medium- to long- term of more 
than ten years, China is likely to achieve the tier-3 and possibly tier-2 status, while Russia lingers 
between tier-4 and tier-5. Key technological barriers that prevent a faster rise of the Chinese 
navy through the rankings include the lack of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, as well as 




Rank Designation Typical Inventory Defining Capabilities Categorization 
1 Global-reach 
power-projection 











capable ships, many 
SSN/SSK, support ships 
At least one major power-
projection operation 






capable ships, many 
SSN/SSK, support ships 
Power-projection missions 
in regions beyond own 
EEZ in addition to 
homeland defense 
 
4 Regional offshore 
coastal defense 
Aviation-capable ships 
(DD, FF), submarines, 
some support ships 
No at-sea fleet air support 
other than organic 
helicopters, thus limited to 
area of land-based aircraft 




5 Regional offshore 
coastal defense 
Smaller ships (FF, 
corvettes), no underway 
replenishment 
Coastal defense operations 
at least in own EEZ and 
slightly beyond 
 
6 Inshore Coastal 
defense 
Only smaller ships 
(Corvettes, FAC) 
Confined to inner reaches 
of own EEZ 
 
7 Regional offshore 
constabulary 
Lightly armed OPV, PB, 
PC for CG-type duties 
Geographic reach like 
Rank 5, but maritime 





Only patrol boats and 
patrol craft 
Confined to missions well 
within own EEZ 
 
9 Inland waterway Patrol craft Waterborne riverine 
defense of landlocked 
states 
 
10 Token Often only one or two 
small craft 




Table 3. Ranking of Navies Based on Sea Control Capacity. 
Source: Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg. Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The Strained Symbiosis (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1996), 53-64, cited in Assessing China’s Naval Power, 60.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that China’s and Russia’s A2/AD strategies as well as U.S. global 
sea control both focus on access to contested maritime territories through offensive conquest. 
Technology and geographical factors both contribute to offense dominance in China’s and 
Russia’s surrounding waters. To address the perceived challenges, the USN has pursued its own 
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buildup in both low-end and high-end capabilities in order to ensure technological edge, 
qualitative superiority, and deterrence. In so doing, all sides have ruled out defensive buildup as 
one possibility to make offensive missions costlier for the other side. In addition to qualitative 
superiority, U.S. analysts, lawmakers and naval war planners have used quantitative measures to 
evaluate the overall balance in naval capabilities between the U.S. and its adversaries. C/R’s 
offensive buildups increase deployment requirements, exponentially raise the costs of 
maintenance and modernization, and therefore make U.S. maritime hegemony much harder to 
sustain in the long term. Not surprisingly, U.S. policymakers have reacted with much more alarm 
to C/R navies because of their peer competitor status. Based on assessments presented in this 
chapter, I argue that relative parity in naval capabilities is present, but ODB is not. The necessary 
conditions for rational signaling are not fulfilled, and offense dominance propels China and 
Russia to pursue offensive naval arms race. 
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CHAPTER 4. “WE HAVE A NOBLE FOE”: 
A SEFL-FULFILLING SECURITY DILEMMA AND HOW TO ALTER IT 
 
On Attempts to Read China’s and Russia’s Intentions 
 
 Offense dominance and relative parity drive states to pursue offensive buildups. 
Consequently, U.S. policymakers cannot and should not evaluate Chinese and Russian arms 
policies as credible signals of intentions. But as we have seen from media narratives in chapter 1, 
many still do it. This chapter seeks to explore the pathways through which policymakers may 
understand state intentions as malign despite lack of clear signals. For one, American 
policymakers sometimes argue that one cannot read intentions from capabilities, not because of 
structural factors but because authoritarian regimes are too secretive with their capabilities. This 
approach disregards the importance of intentions all together, and leads to the conclusion that 
one needs not to assess intentions at all but should “confront power with power and threat with 
threat.”163 For another, other observers and policymakers consider “aggressive” or “malign” 
intentions to be driving C/R’s naval buildups simply because A2/AD capabilities encroach on the 
global sea control that underpins U.S. maritime dominance. This view once again disregards the 
structural factors at work. Consequently, regardless of whether U.S. lawmakers are able to read 
intentions from the naval modernization programs, they consider a counter-buildup as necessary. 
This chapter and thesis concludes with the argument that the structural conditions outlined in the 
previous chapters have presently led to the onset of a rational arms race, although some steps can 
be taken by all parties involved to alter offense dominance and slow down investments in 
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offensive capacity.  
 From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, “lack of transparency” is an all-inclusive 
term that explains why they cannot read capabilities or intentions. During a senate hearing in 
2014, Bob Corker, the Democrat ranking member on the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
stated: “The pace and lack of transparency with respect to the Chinese military modernization, 
coupled with China’s actions in the East and South China Seas, has cast doubt on the idea of the 
peaceful rise of China.” Daniel Russel, the senior Department of State (DoS) official directly in 
charge of all Asia Pacific affairs, concurred in the same session: “China’s neighbors and many 
Americans feel China’s long-term intentions, which . . . is fueled both by its problematic 
behavior with regard to territorial disputes [and] the opacity of its military modernization, 
represent an impediment to real progress. . . in the bilateral relationship [and] in regional 
growth.”164 Despite all public appeals for transparency, it is unclear how China may comply with 
the terms without making significant security sacrifices. Reflective of the “basic paradox of tacit 
bargaining,” the constant condemnation of “opacity” is states playing the blame game, in an 
effort to put pressure on the other side to sacrifice security in order to signal benign intentions.165 
By finding faults with China’s secrecy, American analysts and lawmakers are essentially looking 
for signals at a time when signaling benign intentions is extremely costly and hard due to offense 
dominance and relative parity. 
 U.S. policymakers and military officers find secrecy so threatening partially because they 
view the modernization programs as part and parcel of a collective threat known as 
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“authoritarianism.” American policymakers call the buildups aggressive because of the perceived 
illiberal nature of C/R’s regimes. For example, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Michael Carpenter claimed: “Across the board, Russia’s aggressive 
actions and flouting of international norms have been enabled by a military modernization 
campaign,” with “significant advances in warfighting technology, especially in the areas of 
precision guided munitions, missile technology, and submarine warfare.”166 Similarly, Jeff 
Smith, a senior fellow at American Foreign Policy Council states in a congressional testimony: 
“By design, the PLA ranks remain conspiracy-minded, hawkish, and insulated from the Western 
world, and even to some liberal influences within China. This is worrying, because many 
Chinese nationalists inside and outside the PLA see the U.S. as engaged in a containment 
strategy designed to prevent China’s rise and undermine its security.”167 U.S. policymakers and 
analysts insinuate a direct causal mechanism between authoritarian regimes and aggressive 
foreign policies. Consequently, they presume buildup of any kind to be “aggressive” and 
“malign.” Instead of asking why and under what conditions states pursue offensive arms policies, 
U.S. policymakers frequently predetermined the intentions of such policies based on their prior 
understandings of a regime and its foreign policy objectives. In so doing, U.S. policymakers risk 
conflating regime type with other structural factors at play, molding new information to support 
their pre-existing beliefs and feeding into an unnecessary arms race.  
 Those in Washington are finding more similarities in the “malign” and aggressive” nature 
                                                
166 U.S. Congress, Senate, Russian Violations of Borders, Treaties, and Human Rights: Hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 114th Cong., 2016, 10 (Testimony of Michael Carpenter). For more comments 
specifically on Russia’s malign influence, see U.S. Congress, Senate, NATO Expansion: Examining the Accession of 
Montenegro: Hearing before Committee on Foreign Relations, 114th Cong., 2016, 11; U.S. Congress, House, 
Military Assessment of Russian Activities and Securities Challenges in Europe: Committee on Armed Services, 115th 
Cong., 2017, 46. 
167 U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Sea, 14-15 (Testimony of 
Jeff Smith). 
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of Chinese and Russian military buildups because they both undermine freedom of navigation 
(FON) and thus indirectly, U.S. global sea control. There has been a growing debate in congress 
regarding the extent to which China and Russia are “watching each other,” or “teaming up” to 
implement A2/AD networks and collectively undermine the existing international maritime order 
based on FON.168 Even the descriptions of the two modernization programs bear resemblance to 
each other. Consider, for example, the following phraseology contained in two congressional 
testimonies. In regard to the PLAN, Dr. Andrew Erickson said: “China’s navy . . . is achieving 
formidable A2/AD capabilities closer to shore. Beijing seeks to wield this growing might to 
carve out in the Yellow, East, and South China Seas an airspace above them, a zone of 
exceptionalism within which existing global security, legal, and resource management norms are 
subordinated to its parochial national interests.”169 In regard to the Russian Navy, General James 
Jones said: “There have also seen the deployment of more aggressive and more capable Russian 
naval forces. Starting with new Arctic bases, to Leningrad in the Baltic and Crimea in the Black 
Sea, Russia has introduced advanced air defense, cruise missile systems and new platforms. Mr. 
Putin is signaling to [the U.S.] that the maritime domain is contested.”170 U.S. senior 
policymakers find the contestation and subordination of an international space to national 
interests, enabled by the A2/AD buildup, indicative of aggressive intentions. The U.S. considers 
the naval buildups highly offensive because they undermine the FON by controlling and 
monopolizing access to certain maritime territories.  
 While FON indeed has normative and legal foundations, the threat that C/R’s naval 
                                                
168 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, Russian Violations of Borders, Treaties, and Human Rights, 23; U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Safeguarding American Interests in East and South China Sea: Hearing before Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 114th Cong., 2015, 23. 
169 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations, 3 (Testimony of Dr. Andrew Erickson). 
170 U.S. Congress, House, Russian Strategy and Military Operations, 34. 
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buildups pose against FON is a military one because FON is the foundation of U.S. maritime 
hegemony. As a continental power and a global hegemon, the U.S. must fulfill its global 
presence through global deployment and forward basing. As Danis Blair, former Commander of 
the U.S. Pacific Command articulated: “The U.S. has a core interest in FON and the maintenance 
of naval mobility and maneuverability and access in the all of the world’s oceans. Freedom of 
navigation is principally a naval and military right.”171 FON is critical to U.S. maritime 
hegemony because it supports surveillance efforts on all exclusive economic zones, and 
guarantees U.S. military access to all areas of the sea where it has vital interests. And capabilities 
that deny such access, as a result, is directly threatening to U.S. maritime hegemony. Unless the 
U.S. is willing to forgo its global influence or commitments as a hegemon, any attempt by 
regional powers to increase security through buildup of capabilities will land in an offensive 
arms race and come to be regarded as aggressive and revisionist regardless of actual intentions. 
 RCT predicts that states will only read other states’ arms policies as costly and credible 
when there is offense-defense distinction and balance, as well as relative parity. This section 
demonstrates that U.S. domestic actors have an outright disregard for structural factors. When 
American policymakers and naval officers cannot not read intentions, they find the lack of 
signals a sign of aggression; when American policymakers and naval officers do read intentions, 
they assume buildups as necessarily dangerous and aggressive because they encroach on 
established U.S. maritime dominance. These readings of intentions occur even when conditions 
have disqualified arms policies as signals of intention. Relative parity in naval capabilities makes 
arms reduction too costly to undertake. Offense dominance makes offensive buildup as the only 
way to pursue security. Given such structural factors, signaling benign intentions becomes 
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extremely difficult. After two-decade U.S. domination over the world’s oceans, the emerging 
great power competition ushers in a new era of rational maritime arms race. 
On Rational Arms Race and Altering the Payoff Structure 
 All three states are already deeply engaged in an arms buildup where territorial conquest 
and counter-conquest are the main objectives. For China and Russia especially, the current naval 
buildup is of unprecedented scale since the founding of the two nations. The deployment of the 
said capabilities have already established an offense-dominated environment where the Chinese 
and Russian navies, with high concentration of vessels in near seas, reach the status of near-peer 
competitors with the USN. Given these structural material variables, uncertainty in intentions 
necessitates an offensive buildup, yet the buildup will likely also result in the other side 
perceiving revisionist intentions. As Montgomery argued in “Breaking Out of Security 
Dilemma,” states that are even slightly unsure about each other’s intentions will find it quite 
dangerous to undertake benign gestures, which then leaves competition as the preferred 
option.172 However, even given the present case of rational arms race, there are still concrete 
steps that each state can take to minimize strategic distrust and lessen offense dominance.  
 The first major impediment to signaling benign intentions is that all credible signals 
would have been very costly in terms of security to the signaling state when intentions are 
uncertain, and the lack of signals only adds to uncertainty in intentions. There are, however, 
possible steps that are not too costly to undertake and yet can meaningfully lessen uncertainty in 
intentions. For example, the DOD has invited China to participate in Rim of the Pacific 
Multilateral Naval Exercise (RIMPAC) for the last 6 years in an effort to engage China in a 
                                                
172 See chapter 1, p. 20. 
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collective security forum. Chinese participation in RIMPAC has withstood many lows in 
bilateral relations such as arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. FON operation in SCS, as a sign of 
good faith in positive bilateral relations. 173 Some lawmakers and military leaders have petitioned 
to cancel China’s invitation to the RIMPAC exercises following Chinese land reclamation acts in 
the SCS.174 This would be a disastrous move that adds to the uncertainty about the other side’s 
intentions. Presently, no formal cooperation exists between the U.S. and Russia like the one 
between the U.S. and China, although the DOD has taken steps to ensure U.S.-Russia mil-to-mil 
contacts. Such arrangements can also be made between Russia, the United States and NATO, 
perhaps to a lesser extent in the beginning. Short of a formal standing relations, multilateral and 
bilateral military forums and cooperation in areas such as disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance missions are the best ways to maintain mil-mil ties. As tensions persist and rise in 
bilateral relations, leaders in Congress should work to institute and strengthen such confidence-
building mechanisms with China and Russia. 
 Second, just short of a formal arms control initiative, all three states can still make efforts 
to divert investments away from surface large combatants and towards cost-imposition 
capabilities such as submarines and electromagnetic jamming technology. ECM capabilities 
make attack costlier for the other side. However, such capabilities do not necessarily effect 
control or conquest of the territorial waters. In other words, it makes coordinated, large-scale 
offensive military campaigns harder for the other side, but does not necessarily increase the 
presence of one’s own military vessels in a given territory. Another possibility is investments in 
                                                
173 For a more detailed history and importance on mil-mil ties, see Roy Kamphausen and Jessica Drun, “What are 
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nuclear submarines. Although there have been great advancements in anti-submarine warfare, 
anti-submarine technologies that can successfully neutralize a nuclear submarine fleet –if they 
were to exist – would be very costly. A nuclear submarine’s greatest value lies in stealth, is 
rarely used for first strike, can carry out counter-value punishment and therefore best serves as 
tools of survivable deterrence. Investments in such technologies are likely to shift the balance 
away from the current offense dominance and more towards neutral offense-defense balance. 
 Last but perhaps the most controversial possibility is to concede all-domain U.S. global 
sea control. U.S. all-domain sea control is the reason why offense dominance is prevalent in the 
first place in all territorial waters bordering rising powers such as China and Russia. Such a 
strategy would likely work better in Baltic and South China Seas than it will in East China Sea, 
given that Japan might rearm as a result of retrenchment of U.S. influence from the region. And 
while one cannot claim with absolute certainty that the withdrawal of a peer competitor can at 
once suspend offense dominance, intense competition will likely subdue and states no longer 
have a need for offensive buildup in order to gain security.  
Conclusion  
 I formerly introduced two competing hypotheses based on great power transition and 
rational signaling theories. I hypothesized that C/R’s arms policies can signal intentions in the 
presence of offense-defense distinguishability, neutral offense-defense balance and relative 
power. I also hypothesized that C/R’s arms policies may not signal intentions if one of the three 
necessary intentions is missing. An investigation of the international strategic environment 
reveals that neutral offense-defense balance does not exist, and offense heavily dominates the 
contested maritime environment. 
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 China and Russia are pursuing highly offensive capabilities but not due to aggressive 
intentions. The structural variables in the international strategic and military environment, 
independent of intentions, compel states to pursue offensive arms policies. The structural 
environment breaks down into offense dominance and near-peer competition. Technological 
development and geographical factors have led to offense dominance in the contested maritime 
space. For one, the current technological development in long-range cruise missiles, for example, 
puts territorial conquest in a much more favorable position than defense. For another, the ocean 
provides natural cover for stealthy vessels like submarines – further aided by technological 
development like the AIP systems – and allows them to deal devastating damage by attacking 
first. Furthermore, due to the interlinked nature of USN’s patrol, alliance, deterrence, 
maintenance and retirement requirements, the rise of C/R navies threatens to upend U.S. 
maritime hegemony in the long term. This threat contributes to the perception of the two navies 
as peer competitors in certain realms of capabilities. The perception of near-peer competition, in 
turn, requires that states must pursue their own buildups in order to secure military superiority in 
anticipation of a potential conflict. When these structural factors entrap multiple great powers, 
we have in our world today a new, rational offensive arms race.  
 Further research on the topic of why states pursue offensive naval arms race should 
evaluate state-level and sub-state level causes. The theory of rational signaling exists exclusively 
at the systemic level of analysis, and therefore omits other drivers of arms buildup such as 
economic growth.175 The argument of economic expansionism as a sign of revisionist intentions 
usually presumes a liberalist causal pathway of rewriting institutional rules of the game. But 
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might high-speed economic development and offensive arms racing behaviors also be 
correlational? The fact that maritime superiority guarantees trade routes certainly suggests so. 
Fast economic development, as in the case of China, might also reinforce the peer-competition 
causal pathway of offensive arms race. The economic-growth argument is certainly a hypothesis 
worth testing as an additional explanation for why states pursue offensive arms race. 
 Arms race is a game of chicken. Demonstrating resolve and escalating risks may seem 
rational from a player’s point of view. But from an outsider’s perspective, it is a game of 
excessive risk, a potentially explosive outcome and with little return to all parties involved. In 
order to lower the incentives to arm or increase the benefits of cooperation, all three states should 
work to alter offense dominance, a key factor that necessitates offensive buildups between near-
peer competitors. Like in any human society, in an international system no state has absolute 
agency. Going forward, it is critical that U.S. naval officers and policymakers recognize the 
structural factors at play so that parties may shift blame away from individual state actors and 
more towards structural influences. For the collective, this is perhaps the only way to break out 




Level Designation Defining Capabilities Required Hardware Logistics, Maintenance, 
Organizational 
Infrastructure 
I Coastal defense 
and mining 
Basic naval competency: independent 
patrolling of coastal waters, mine 
laying or defensive operations 






Ships operate independently close to 
shore; targeting of surface vessels, 
limited VHF communications 
Smaller ships with converted army 





surface warfare; ships act 
independently or in groups; no far-sea 
operations extended periods; limited 
air/surface search, targeting of low-
tech missiles 
Corvettes, older frigates, 











Targeting of military and civilian 
shipping traffic at moderate distances; 
submarines acting independently, 
stationing themselves at choke points 











Combined anti-submarine operations 
with ships and helicopters acting in 
coordination 
Dedicated surface combatants with 
embarked helicopters; elementary 
data links for tactical coordination; 










High integrative demands on fleet due 
to inherent difficulty of subsurface 
ASW targeting 
Quiet, advanced submarines (nuclear 





VII Naval strike 
and limited air 
control 
Important threshold which signals the 
ability to project power ashore; 
forming of carrier battle groups 
sharing moderate amounts of tactical 
data 
Basic carrier with embarked aircraft, 
other large aviation-capable ships for 
carrier protection; satellite imagery 
or land-based, long-range maritime 
patrol aircraft, basic comm 
Basic intelligence; 








True “blue water” capability; deep 
strike capability against both land and 
sea targets, forward presence 
Advanced carriers, capable of 
launching aircraft; advanced comm 
systems, sophisticated offensive and 
















True network-centric forms of 
warfare that enable a force to 
successfully interdict an 
adversary’s assets in any 
operating medium  
Over the horizon reconnaissance, 
surveillance, target acquisition 
systems, real-time processing, 
pervasive communications, 
advanced tactical displays 
Table 4A. Classification of Naval Combat Proficiency Levels based on Mission Complexity. 
Source: Ashley J Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 
164-176. 
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Name/Project number Chief Role & Fleet Disruption/delay, if any Active Expecting 
Total 
Frigates 
Gorshkov, project 22350 Blue-water, Black Sea 
Fleet 






Coastal mission &  Ukraine-caused sanctions 3 6 before 
2020a 
Corvettes 
Steregushchiy, 20380 Coastal, multi-purpose, 
all four major fleets 




Baltic and Northern 
Fleets 












Coastal mission, Black 
Sea,c and Caspian 
Flotillad 
Ukraine-caused sanctions 8 15 
Karakurt, project 22800 Coastal & far-sea, Black 
Sea and Northern Fleets 
-- 0  18 
Destroyers  
Lider, project 23560e Far-sea, Northern Fleet 
and Pacific Fleet 




















Borei, project 955/955A Far-sea, Northern & 
Pacific Fleets 
Funding issues 4h 8 before 
2020 
Lada, project 677 Northern & Blatic Fleets Engineering deficiencies led 




Kilo-class), project 636.3 
Anti-shipping and anti-
submarine in shallow 
water, Black Sea and 
Pacific Fleets 
-- 6 12 before 
2021 
Husky, project # 
unknown 
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Table 5A. Russian Surface Combatants Modernization Projects, Problems and Non-Deliveries. 
a. “Construction of Russia’s fourth Project 11356 ship to begin on 18 April,” Naval Technology, April 17, 2013, 
https://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsconstruction-russias-fourth-project-11356-ship-begin-18-april/ 
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b. “Project 20385 Gremyaschiy class corvette,” Global Security, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/20385.htm 
c. “The newest SRC ‘Serpukhov’ and ‘Green Dol’ of the Black Sea Fleet will be part of the permanent connection of 
the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea,” Ministry of Defense of Russia, October 10, 2016, 
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12098513@egNews 
d. Two Buyan-M vessels were deployed from the Black Sea Fleet to the Baltic Fleet in support of Russia’s 
intervention in the Syrian Civil War. 
e. Julian Cooper, “Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020,” 107. 
f. The first Yasen-class submarine was first designed in 1993, and was only recently handed over to the navy in 
2015. “Yasen/Graney Class Submarine”; “Russia commissions new attack submarine,” Sputnik News, 
December 30, 2013, https://sptnkne.ws/gXu7 
g. “Second Yasen nuclear submarine launched in northern Russian port,” TASS, March 31, 2017, 
http://tass.com/defense/938628. Various sources dispute the total number of Yasen-class submarines to be 
built. Another source at lenta.ru says 10. “Russia to build ten Yasen-class subs,” 
http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=12780 
h. As of February 2018, 3 Borei are active in duty; the fourth and the first Borei-A vessel will be officially in 2018. 





Table 6A. PLAN Frigate Commissioning. 




Table 7A. PLAN Destroyer Commissioning. 
Source: IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2017-2018, and previous editions, cited in “China Naval Modernization,” 33. 
 
Table 8A. PLAN Submarine Commissioning. 





Table 9A. Acoustic Quietness of Chinese and Russian Nuclear Submarine. 
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